Control-Theoretic Defense Strategies for Cyber-Physical Systems

该项目将设计下一代防御机制，以保护关键基础设施，如电网，大型工业工厂和供水系统。这些关键基础设施是复杂的，主要是由于网络和物理组件的集成，高阶行为和功能的存在，以及复杂而庞大的互连模式。恶意攻击者可以利用基础设施的复杂性，并通过网络攻击（即侵入计算和通信系统）和/或物理攻击（篡改致动器，传感器和控制系统）损害系统的功能。这项工作将开发关键基础设施和攻击的数学模型，开发智能控制理论安全机制，并在行业认可的仿真平台上验证研究结果。该项目将直接影响国家安全和经济竞争力，其结果将对公用事业公司有用。随着科学的进步，研究人员还将参与教育工作，将这项研究带到UCR的课堂上，并将通过科学出版物传播他们的结果。这项工作还将为本科生和研究生创造几个机会，在加州大学河滨分校从事研究，加州大学河滨分校是美国最具种族多样性的研究密集型机构之一。这项研究包括理论，计算和实验研究，旨在描述复杂的网络物理系统的脆弱性，重点是电力网络，和控制理论防御机制，以确保对意外故障和恶意攻击的保护和适度的性能下降。该项目提出了一种变革性的网络物理安全方法，该方法建立在统一的控制理论框架基础上，对网络物理系统、攻击和防御策略进行建模。该项目将开展三项主要研究活动，从基础科学和工程研究到使用行业认可的模拟工具进行分析：（1）对网络物理攻击及其对系统稳定性和性能的影响进行建模和分析;（2）设计监测器，以揭示和区分意外和恶性突发事件;以及（3）随机和高度动态的信息物理系统的自适应防御策略的综合。结果将首先从纯控制理论的角度，重点是随机，切换和动态网络物理系统的特点，以突出基础研究的挑战，然后专门为智能电网的情况下，以澄清监视器，攻击和防御策略的实施。研究结果和策略将通过使用RTDS仿真系统来验证电力网络的情况，RTDS仿真系统是一种行业认可的动态行为，故障，攻击，监控系统和防御策略的实时测试工具。

This project will design next-generation defense mechanisms to protect critical infrastructures, such as power grids, large industrial plants, and water distribution systems. These critical infrastructures are complex primarily due to the integration of cyber and physical components, the presence of high-order behaviors and functions, and an intricate and large interconnection pattern. Malicious attackers can exploit the complexity of the infrastructure, and compromise a system's functionality through cyber attacks (that is hacking into the computation and communication systems) and/or physical attacks (tampering with the actuators, sensors and the control system). This work will develop mathematical models of critical infrastructures and attacks, develop intelligent control-theoretic security mechanisms, and validate the findings on an industry-accredited simulation platform. This project will directly impact national security and economic competitiveness, and the results will be available and useful to utility companies. To accompany the scientific advances, the investigators will also engage in educational efforts to bring this research to the classroom at UCR, and will disseminate their results via scientific publications. The work will also create several opportunities for undergraduate and graduate students to engage in research at UCR, one of the nation's most ethnically diverse research-intensive institutions.This study encompasses theoretical, computational, and experimental research at UCR aimed at characterizing vulnerabilities of complex cyber-physical systems, with a focus on electric power networks, and control-theoretic defense mechanisms to ensure protection and graceful performance degradation against accidental faults and malicious attacks. This project proposes a transformative approach to cyber-physical security, which builds on a unified control-theoretic framework to model cyber-physical systems, attacks, and defense strategies. This project will undertake three main research initiatives ranging from fundamental scientific and engineering research to analysis using industry-accepted simulation tools: (1) modeling and analysis of cyber-physical attacks, and their impact on system stability and performance; (2) design of monitors to reveal and distinguish between accidental and malignant contingencies; and (3) synthesis of adaptive defense strategies for stochastic and highly dynamic cyber-physical systems. Results will first be characterized from a pure control-theoretic perspective with focus on stochastic, switching, and dynamic cyber-physical systems, so as to highlight fundamental research challenges, and then specialized for the case of smart grid, so as to clarify the implementation of monitors, attacks, and defense strategies. The findings and strategies will be validated for the case of power networks by using the RTDS simulation system, which is an industry-accredited tool for real-time tests of dynamic behavior, faults, attacks, monitoring systems, and defensive strategies.