Regional favoritism and development

为什么有些国家似乎永远陷入贫困，这可以说是经济学中最重要的问题。在这一点上，一篇有影响力的文献表明，全球发展水平差异巨大的一个重要原因是政治。特别是，有人认为，欠发达国家的政府往往选择的政策效率低下，造成严重的经济扭曲。这种低效政策的一个突出的、大家都认为代价高昂的例子是地区偏袒——政府为了某些地区或群体的利益而扭曲政策，牺牲整个国家的利益。然而，令人费解的是，为什么政府会继续实行地区偏袒，或者更普遍地说，维持明显不是最优的政策。这个项目的目的是为这个问题提供一个全面的答案。因此，我们将研究区域偏袒背后的动机、采取的手段以及后果。我们计划探讨的具体问题包括：1。谁是地区偏袒的主要受益者？地区偏袒是以公共产品的形式使大多数人受益，还是以主要使地区精英受益的方式分配资源？不同特征的个体之间是否存在差异，例如，与国家领导人种族相同的个体是否比其他个体受益更多？2. 优势地区如何利用资源？从长远来看，偏袒是否有助于提高地区增长，还是额外的资源只会扩大短期消费？例如，受资助地区的教育程度和健康状况是否有所改善？3. 为什么政府会偏袒？在专制的背景下，什么样的政治动机很重要？或者领导者的主要动机是家乡偏见——对家乡或所在群体的一种情感上的、非政治上的依恋？个人的政治态度是否会随着他们所经历的偏袒程度而改变？以前关于撒哈拉以南非洲地区偏袒的研究尚未全面回答这些问题。因此，通过研究它们（同时强调撒哈拉以南非洲国家的制度异质性以及这种异质性所隐含的区域偏袒动机的差异），我们将对文献做出实质性贡献。具体地说，探索这些问题不仅将促进我们对发展中国家区域偏袒的原因和后果的理解，而且还使我们能够得出关于如何克服从事低效政策的动机或至少如何减轻其不利后果的实际建议。

Why some countries seem to be perpetually trapped in poverty is arguably the most important question in Economics. On this point, an influential literature suggests that an important cause for the vastly different levels of development across the globe is politics. In particular, it is argued that governments in under-developed countries often choose policies that are inefficient and cause severe economic distortions. One prominent and by all accounts costly example of such inefficient policies is regional favoritism - the distortion of policies by the government to the benefit of selected regions or groups at the expense of the country as a whole. It is, however, puzzling why governments would continue to engage in regional favoritism or, more generally, maintain policies that are clearly suboptimal. The purpose of this project is to provide a comprehensive answer to this question. We will thus study the motivation underlying regional favoritism, the means adopted, as well as the consequences. The specific questions that we plan to explore include: 1. Who is the main beneficiary from regional favoritism? Does regional favoritism take the form of public goods that benefit the population at large or are resources channeled in ways that benefit mostly the regional elite? Are there differences between individuals with different characteristics, e.g. do individuals that share the ethnicity of the national leader benefit more than other individuals? 2. How are the resources used by favored regions? Does favoritism help to increase regional growth in the long-run or do the additional resources only expand short-term consumption? Do educational attainment and health outcomes, for example, improve in the regions that are favored? 3. Why do governments engage in favoritism? What political incentives matter in autocratic contexts? Or are leaders mainly motivated by a home bias - an emotional, nonpolitical attachment to their home region or their group? Do individuals' political attitudes change in response to the degree of favoritism they experience? These questions have not yet been comprehensively answered by previous studies on regional favoritism in sub-Saharan Africa.Thus, by studying them (while emphasizing the institutional heterogeneity of sub-Saharan African countries and the differences in motives for regional favoritism this heterogeneity implies), we will make a substantive contribution to the literature. Specifically, exploring these questions will not only advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of regional favoritism in the developing world, but also allow us to derive practical recommendations as to how incentives to engage in inefficient policies can be overcome or, at least, how their adverse consequences can be mitigated.