A theory of insititutional cooperation : Experimental and simulation study of mutual-sancitoning voluntarily provided through subjective and objective transformation of the incentive structure

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We have successfully achived the goal of the research of developing a theory of instrumental cooperation.The major findings of the research are the followings. (1) Through linking choices in the first-order dilemma and the second-order dilemma, members can objectively transform the original Prisoner's Dilemma structure into that of Assurance Game. (2) The goal/expectation theory of Pruitt & Kimmel can be interpreted to represent the role of subjective transformation of the incentive structure from PD to AG.(3) The well-known power of the Tit-for-Tat strategy in iterated PD situations is due to the fact that the strategy objectively transforms the original PD structure into AG structure. (4) Commitment formation between particular partners in a PD network situation provides an avenue leading to structural transformation via process (3) discussed above. (5) The Out-for-Tat strategy know to be effective in the "selective play" situation introduces the same structural transformation at the level of mate selection.These findings points to the possibility of instrumental cooperation without costs through transformation of the incentive structure from PD to AG.This implies that instrumental cooperation can be provided without causing a second-order social dilemma.These findings provide theoretical bases for the role playd by the Assurance type incentive structure, and encouraging social dilemma researchers to pay more attention to that type of incentive structure rather than solely focusing on the PD structure.The results also suggest that trust be the main issue to be addressed in future research on social dilemma