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Psycho-social Foundations for Building Trust Societies

建立信任社会的心理社会基础

基本信息

批准号：
14201014
负责人：
YAMAGISHI Toshio
金额：
$ 31.53万
依托单位：
HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2005
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The goal of this study was to clarify the mechanisms that promote voluntarily based social order, not constrained by the closed nature of social relations, in a situation in which provision is "assurance" of security based on commitment relations is not possible. We used "artificial societies" created in the laboratory to achieve this goal. As a means to achieve this goal, we found that building a trust relationship (i.e., transforming an opportunistic relationship into a trust relationship) requires risk taking. We further identified socio-relational and socio-institutional conditions that are required for this transformation. Specifically, our results indicate the followings. ◆Risk taking plays an indispensable role in building a trust relationship. ◆In building a trust relationship, a strategy to cooperate while reducing the risk of trusting to the minimal is highly effective. ◆The role that reputation plays in reducing the agency problem caused by information asymmetry varies depending on the nature of the society or market-whether it is open or closed. Negative reputation is effective in closed societies, and positive reputation is effective in closed societies. ◆Punishment of non-cooperators in a group is produced by a different psychological mechanism that produces punishment of out-group defectors. ◆Heuristics explain cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game better than utility transformation model. ◆Expectation of generalized exchange within a group is indispensable in cooperation toward in-group members, whether the groups are minimal groups or nationality groups. However, it is not a necessary condition for cooperation toward in-group members when interactions among group members exist. ◆Experience of collectivistic social institutions make collectivistic (or interdependent) self-construal and causal attribution (i.e., collectivistic belief system) salient.

这项研究的目的是澄清促进自愿为基础的社会秩序的机制，不受社会关系的封闭性，在这种情况下，提供是基于承诺关系的安全的“保证”是不可能的。我们使用在实验室中创建的“人工社会”来实现这一目标。作为实现这一目标的一种手段，我们发现建立信任关系（即，将机会主义关系转变为信任关系）需要承担风险。我们进一步确定了这种转变所需的社会关系和社会体制条件。具体而言，我们的研究结果表明以下几点。◆承担风险在建立信任关系中起着不可或缺的作用。◆在建立信任关系的过程中，在合作的同时将信任的风险降至最低的策略是非常有效的。◆声誉在减少信息不对称引起的代理问题中所起的作用因社会或市场的性质而异--是开放的还是封闭的。消极声誉在封闭社会中有效，积极声誉在封闭社会中有效。◆对群体中不合作者的惩罚是由一种不同的心理机制产生的，这种心理机制会对群体外的背叛者产生惩罚。◆启发式模型比效用转换模型更能解释一次性囚徒困境博弈中的合作问题。◆无论是最小群体还是民族群体，对群体内成员的合作都离不开对群体内普遍交换的期待。然而，当群体成员之间存在相互作用时，它并不是对群体内成员合作的必要条件。◆集体主义社会制度的经验使集体主义（或相互依存）的自我联系和因果归因（即，集体主义信仰体系（Collectivistic Belief System）。