Competition and cooperation. The Franco-German conflict over European currency integration, 1968–1983

该研究项目考察了联邦共和国德国和法国之间均衡的变化及其对20世纪70年代欧洲货币一体化的影响。 由于法国在世界政治中的影响力下降和联邦共和国的经济崛起，法国在欧共体的明显霸权无法维持。布雷顿森林体系结束后的货币动荡尤其反映了这一点。如果两国在货币一体化的核心问题上没有达成利益协调，欧洲一体化在20世纪70年代的进一步发展是不可能的。该项目研究了为什么以及如何在漫长的1970年代，尽管在利益和金融文化方面存在着巨大的差异，以及在这一领域的重大挫折，但还是达成了共识。

The research project examines the change in equilibrium between the Federal Republic of Germany and France and its effects on the European Monetary Integration in the 1970s. The apparent hegemony of France in the EC could not be sustained in view of the decreasing influence of France in world politics and the economic rise of the Federal Republic. This was particularly reflected in the currency turmoil following the end of the Bretton Woods order. Without a reconciliation of interests between the two countries on the central question of currency integration, further development of European integration in the 1970s was not possible. The project examines why and how, in the course of the long 1970s, a consensus was reached in spite of striking differences in interests and financial culture as well as significant setbacks in this field.