Competition and cooperation. The Franco-German conflict over European currency integration, 1968–1983

该研究项目考察了德意志联邦共和国和法国之间均衡的变化及其对1970年代欧洲货币一体化的影响。鉴于法国在世界政治中的影响力下降和联邦共和国的经济崛起，法国在欧共体中的明显霸权不可能持续下去。这在布雷顿森林体系结束后的货币动荡中得到了特别的反映。如果两国不能在货币一体化这一核心问题上达成利益和解，上世纪70年代欧洲一体化的进一步发展就不可能实现。该项目审查了在漫长的1970年代期间，尽管在利益和金融文化方面存在显著差异，并在这一领域遭遇重大挫折，但为何以及如何达成共识。

The research project examines the change in equilibrium between the Federal Republic of Germany and France and its effects on the European Monetary Integration in the 1970s. The apparent hegemony of France in the EC could not be sustained in view of the decreasing influence of France in world politics and the economic rise of the Federal Republic. This was particularly reflected in the currency turmoil following the end of the Bretton Woods order. Without a reconciliation of interests between the two countries on the central question of currency integration, further development of European integration in the 1970s was not possible. The project examines why and how, in the course of the long 1970s, a consensus was reached in spite of striking differences in interests and financial culture as well as significant setbacks in this field.