Competition and cooperation. The Franco-German conflict over European currency integration, 1968–1983

该研究项目考察了20世纪70年代德意志联邦共和国和法国之间均衡的变化及其对欧洲货币一体化的影响。鉴于法国在世界政治中的影响力下降和联邦共和国的经济崛起，法国在欧共体的明显霸权地位是无法维持的。这一点在布雷顿森林秩序终结后的货币动荡中得到了特别反映。如果两国在货币一体化这一核心问题上没有利益协调，20世纪70年代欧洲一体化的进一步发展是不可能的。该项目考察了为什么以及如何在漫长的20世纪70年代期间，尽管在利益和金融文化上存在巨大差异，并在该领域遭遇重大挫折，但仍达成了共识。

The research project examines the change in equilibrium between the Federal Republic of Germany and France and its effects on the European Monetary Integration in the 1970s. The apparent hegemony of France in the EC could not be sustained in view of the decreasing influence of France in world politics and the economic rise of the Federal Republic. This was particularly reflected in the currency turmoil following the end of the Bretton Woods order. Without a reconciliation of interests between the two countries on the central question of currency integration, further development of European integration in the 1970s was not possible. The project examines why and how, in the course of the long 1970s, a consensus was reached in spite of striking differences in interests and financial culture as well as significant setbacks in this field.