Dynastic Politicians, Seniority, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from Japan and the United States

王朝政治家、资历和政府支出：来自日本和美国的理论和证据

• 批准号: 24830095
• 负责人: ASAKO Yasushi
• 金额: $ 1.91万
• 依托单位: Waseda University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2012-08-31 至 2014-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-24830095/
• 关键词: 議員属性; 公共政策; 政府支出; 利益誘導政策; 世襲議員; 議員の年功; 多選禁止制; 選挙

This research investigates the effect of political dynasty and seniority of politicians on government spending by using formal models and data of Japan and the US. First, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. Second, the amount of spending decreases as the average seniority of a legislature increases from low to moderate, while it increases as the average seniority increases from moderate to high. Third, the adoption of term limits that dramatically reduces average seniority increases the amount of spending.

本文利用日本和美国的正式模型和数据，考察了政治王朝和政治人物的资历对政府支出的影响。首先，与非王朝立法者相比，王朝立法者给地区带来了更多的分配，获得了更高的选举成功率，尽管他们带来了更大的分配利益，但却损害了地区的经济绩效。其次，随着立法机构平均资历从低到中等增加，支出金额减少，而随着平均资历从中等到高增加，支出金额增加。第三，大幅降低平均资历的任期限制增加了开支。

项目成果

Seniority, Term Limits, and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence from the United States

资历、任期限制和政府支出：来自美国的理论和证据

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: 下木なつみ;藤村美穂;竹内和雄;浅古泰史
• 通讯作者: 浅古泰史

Seniority, Term Limits, and Government Spending : Theory and Evidence from United States

资历、任期限制和政府支出：来自美国的理论和证据

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: 飯島昇藏;小高康照;近藤和貴;佐々木潤(共訳);竹内和雄;Hirotsugu Kitada;溝川藍;Kazuo Takeuchi;Hirotsugu Kitada and Akira Higashida;近藤和貴;溝川藍;浅古泰史
• 通讯作者: 浅古泰史