Analysis of the efficiency and representativeness of the bureaucracies

本研究以127个国家1984-2010年的数据为基础，运用博弈论建模和定量分析的方法，对官僚与民主之间的关系进行了研究。我们发现，民主国家和威权国家通常都有昂贵但高质量的官僚机构。然而，管理机构的动机完全不同。与此同时，官僚机构的质量差异也影响着公民的策略，他们有时会选择接受现有的政体，还是试图将政体从威权转变为民主，或者反之亦然。

This research searches for the relationship between bureaucracies and democracies, using the game theoretical modeling and quantitative analysis which bases on the dataset of 127 countries, 1984-2010. We reveal that both democracies and authoritarian states often have costly but high-quality bureaucracies. However, the motivations of the governing body are totally different. At the same time, the quality difference of the bureaucracies also influences the strategies of citizens who sometimes choose whether accepting the present polity or tries to change the polity from authoritarian to democracies or vice versa.