An inquiry into the opportunistic behavior by decision makers : Heisei Municipality Amalgamation in Japan

本研究通过考察市长的累积任期如何影响预算规模和地方政府整合，重新审视当选官员的任期问题。通过边干边学，多任期任职者从政府支出中获得更大的寻租潜力。他们在预算编制方面的努力程度随着服务年限的增加而增加，因此预算规模往往随着市长任期的累积而增加。它们也更有可能进行以其所在地为主导实体的兼并。我们使用日本市政府的数据来检验这些假设，发现长期任职的市长扩大了公共活动，并与较小的合作伙伴进行合并。

This research revisits the issue of elected officials’terms by examining how the cumulative tenure of municipality mayors affects budget size and local government consolidations. Multi-term incumbents enjoy greater rent-seeking potential from government expenditure through learning-by-doing. Their effort levels in budget formulation rise with the length of service and thereby budget size tends to grow with cumulative mayoral terms. They are also more likely to pursue mergers in which their localities are the dominant entities. We test these hypotheses using data on municipalities in Japan and find that long-serving mayors expand public activities and engage in consolidations with smaller partners.