Do we see adverse selection in whole life and term life insurance : from economical and actuarial point ?

从经济和精算的角度来看，我们是否在终身寿险和定期寿险中看到逆向选择？

• 批准号: 23530553
• 负责人: YAMAMOTO Shinichi
• 金额: $ 3万
• 依托单位: Ritsumeikan University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530553/
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Selective effects; Whole life insurance; Term life insurance; Automatic renewal; 逆選択; モラルハザード; 生命保険; アクチュアリー; 死亡保険; ミクロデータ; 自殺

This study provides empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the life insurance market. An analysis of micro data from more than 1.6 million automatic renewal term life insurance contracts, issued by a Japanese life insurance company, reveals that owing to medical and other selections, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard problems could not be recognized with an automatic renewal term life insurance (before renewal). However, after the renewal, adverse selection and moral hazard did occur in the subsequent 10 years. Considering intensifying price competition, a review of automatic renewal of term life insurance may be required for equal distribution of the financial burden amongst policyholders and for the financial soundness of life insurance companies.

本研究提供了寿险市场存在逆向选择的经验证据。对日本一家人寿保险公司签发的160多万份自动续保定期人寿保险合同的微观数据进行分析后发现，由于医疗和其他选择，自动续保定期人寿保险（续保前）既不存在逆向选择问题，也不存在道德风险问题。但在续约之后，在随后的10年中，确实出现了逆向选择和道德风险。考虑到价格竞争加剧，定期人寿保险的自动续保可能需要进行审查，以便在保单持有人之间公平分配财务负担，并确保人寿保险公司的财务稳健。

项目成果

A micro data analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard

逆向选择与道德风险的微观数据分析

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: Takau Yoneyama;Shinichi Yamamoto;W. Jean Kwon
• 通讯作者: W. Jean Kwon

Who posseses more Knowledge about Insureds' health, the Insurer or the Insured?

保险人和被保险人谁对被保险人的健康了解更多？

• 作者: Takau Yoneyama;Shinichi Yamamoto;W. Jean Kwon
• 通讯作者: W. Jean Kwon

An Experimental Study on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

逆向选择与道德风险的实验研究

• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management
• 作者: S. Yamamoto,T. Yoneyama;Kwon;J.W.
• 通讯作者: J.W.

Who Possesses More Knowledge about Insureds'Health : the Insurer or Insureds? A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Using Cases of Japanese Life Insurance Companies

谁对被保险人的健康状况更了解：保险人还是被保险人？

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: S. Yamamoto,T. Yoneyama;Kwon;J.W.
• 通讯作者: J.W.