Do we see adverse selection in whole life and term life insurance : from economical and actuarial point ?

从经济和精算的角度来看，我们是否在终身寿险和定期寿险中看到逆向选择？

• 批准号: 23530553
• 负责人: YAMAMOTO Shinichi
• 金额: $ 3万
• 依托单位: Ritsumeikan University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530553/
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Selective effects; Whole life insurance; Term life insurance; Automatic renewal; 逆選択; モラルハザード; 生命保険; アクチュアリー; 死亡保険; ミクロデータ; 自殺

This study provides empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the life insurance market. An analysis of micro data from more than 1.6 million automatic renewal term life insurance contracts, issued by a Japanese life insurance company, reveals that owing to medical and other selections, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard problems could not be recognized with an automatic renewal term life insurance (before renewal). However, after the renewal, adverse selection and moral hazard did occur in the subsequent 10 years. Considering intensifying price competition, a review of automatic renewal of term life insurance may be required for equal distribution of the financial burden amongst policyholders and for the financial soundness of life insurance companies.

这项研究提供了与人寿保险市场中不利选择相一致的经验证据。日本人寿保险公司发行的160万自动续订期限人寿保险合同的微观数据的分析表明，由于医疗和其他选择，不良选择和道德危害问题都无法通过自动续订期限的人寿保险（在续集之前）认识到。但是，在续订后，在随后的10年中确实发生了不利选择和道德危害。考虑到加强价格竞争，可能需要对定期人寿保险的自动续订进行审查，以使保单持有人之间的财务负担同等分配以及人寿保险公司的财务状况。

项目成果

A micro data analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard

逆向选择与道德风险的微观数据分析

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: Takau Yoneyama;Shinichi Yamamoto;W. Jean Kwon
• 通讯作者: W. Jean Kwon

Who posseses more Knowledge about Insureds' health, the Insurer or the Insured?

保险人和被保险人谁对被保险人的健康了解更多？

• 作者: Takau Yoneyama;Shinichi Yamamoto;W. Jean Kwon
• 通讯作者: W. Jean Kwon

An Experimental Study on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

逆向选择与道德风险的实验研究

• 发表时间: 2012
• 期刊: Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management
• 作者: S. Yamamoto,T. Yoneyama;Kwon;J.W.
• 通讯作者: J.W.

Who Possesses More Knowledge about Insureds'Health : the Insurer or Insureds? A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Using Cases of Japanese Life Insurance Companies

谁对被保险人的健康状况更了解：保险人还是被保险人？

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: S. Yamamoto,T. Yoneyama;Kwon;J.W.
• 通讯作者: J.W.