Collaborative Research in Experimental Studies of Auctions and Markets with Asymmetric Information

该项目扩展并完成了对英国共同价值拍卖、具有不对称(内部)信息的共同价值拍卖以及在实验性拍卖市场中的学习过程的实验研究。该项目还完成了休斯敦建筑业招标过程的案例研究。在之前的NSF拨款中，调查人员发现了英国拍卖中存在“赢家诅咒”(中标者蒙受损失)的确凿证据。这在方法论上是一个重要的结果，因为它与现有的竞价理论相矛盾，而且由于英国共同价值拍卖是一种广泛使用的拍卖机制，因此它在实质上是重要的。这些实验采用了英国的计时器程序，即商品的价格从可能的最低值开始，然后稳步上升。投标人在表示有意退出拍卖之前是积极的，这一决定对于该物品的销售是不可撤销的。最后一个活跃的投标人赢得了这件物品，支付了倒数第二个投标人退出竞标的价格。实验表明，中标者的退出价格向其他竞标者透露信息，减少但不能消除中标者的诅咒。进一步的研究应该为减轻或完全消除拍卖中赢家诅咒的制度和做法提供新的有用的见解。休斯敦建筑业的案例研究尤其有趣。为了确定拍卖市场调查结果的概括性，调查人员进行了一系列低价、普通价值的拍卖，以比较学生主体和来自休斯顿建筑业的经验丰富的专业人士的表现。在所有主题池中都发现了类似的行为，因为在这两个案例中，投标人都受到了赢家的诅咒，中标导致的损失，以及投标人数量的增加加剧了损失。这些结果提出了一个重要的问题：为什么企业高管在现实世界的拍卖中成功，而在实验室的拍卖中不成功？该案例研究确定了一些现实世界的制度特征和做法，以减少赢家诅咒的影响。

This project extends and completes experimental investigations of English common value auctions, common value auctions with asymmetric (insider) information, and learning processes in experimental auction markets. The project also finishes a case study of the bidding process in the Houston construction industry. Under the previous NSF grant the investigators found conclusive evidence of a "winner's curse" (winning bidders suffer losses) in English auctions. This is an important result methodologically because it contradicts existing theories of bidding and it is important substantively since the English common value auction is a widely used mechanism for auctions. The experiments employed an English clock procedure whereby prices start at the lowest possible value for the item and increase steadily. Bidders are active until they signal their intention to drop out of the auction, which decision is irrevocable for the sale of that item. The last active bidder wins the item, paying the price at which the next to last bidder dropped out. The experiments demonstrated that the dropout prices of losing bidders reveal information to the other bidders and reduce but do not eliminate the winner's curse. Further research should provide new and useful insights into institutions and practices that mitigate or eliminate entirely the winner's curse in auctions. The case study of the construction industry in Houston is especially interesting. In order to determine the generalizability of the auction market findings, the investigators conducted a series of low price, common value offer auctions in comparing the performance of student subjects with experienced professionals from the Houston construction industry. Qualitatively similar behavior was found across subject pools as in both cases bidders suffered from the winner's curse, losing money as a consequence of winning the item, and increasing the number of bidders exacerbated the losses. These results raised an important question: Why are business executives successful in real world auctions and unsuccessful in laboratory auctions? The case study identifies a number of real world institutional features and practices that reduce the effects of the winner's curse.