An Experimental Analysis of Cooperation in Finitely RepeatedGames

这个项目涉及有限重复博弈中合作的实验室实验的设计和执行。需要检查的特殊条件包括非约束性通信（“廉价谈话”）。其他实验旨在调查合作水平与作为可能的惩罚或奖励的结果的回报属性之间的关系。博弈论学家对动态多阶段博弈中的均衡合作模型给予了相当大的关注。这种合作发生的必要条件受到改变游戏结构的市场和个人特征的影响。这个项目考察了这些特征的行为意义。这样的评价对今后的理论工作具有重要意义。此外，从实验室数据中获得的见解可能有助于预测在自然发生的市场中何时会出现合作结果。许多政策辩论都围绕着对经济主体合作行为程度的假设。例如，对横向合并提出质疑的可取性在很大程度上取决于合并后出现阴谋的可能性。同样，如果消费者和生产者合作，在购买前没有观察到产品质量，消费者保护政策可能就没有必要了。

This project involves the design and execution of laboratory experiments on cooperation in finitely repeated games. Particular conditions to be examined include nonbinding communication ("cheap talk"). Other experiments are designed to investigate the relationship between cooperation levels and the payoff properties of outcomes that serve as possible punishments or rewards. Game theorists have devoted considerable attention to models of equilibrium cooperation in dynamic, multi-stage games. The conditions thought to be necessary for such cooperation to occur are affected by market and individual characteristics that alter the structure of the game. This project examines the behavioral significance of these characteristics. Such an assessment is important for future theoretical work. In addition, insights gained from laboratory data may aid in predicting when cooperative outcomes will arise in naturally occurring markets. Many policy debates turn on assumptions about the extent to which economic agents behave cooperatively. The desirability of challenging a horizontal merger, for example, depends largely on the likelihood of a post-merger conspiracy. Similarly, when product quality is unobserved prior to purchase, consumer-protection policies may be unnecessary if consumers and producers cooperate.