Adaptive Behavior and Cooperation in Experimental Coordination Games

该项目继续研究实验游戏中的协调问题。它通过研究过去关于协调游戏的实验的时间序列和通过设计新的游戏来评估适应行为的替代理论。它考察了进化稳定性的能力，并用遗传算法以及个体学习模型来解释游戏的动态。该项目还研究了合作的基础，这贯穿了许多先前关于实验性协调游戏的工作。这项研究已经并将继续对经济学做出重要贡献。本项目中研究的这类协调博弈已被用来检验宏观经济中就业不足均衡的理论。产业组织中的协调问题主要出现在标准化、新企业进入寡头垄断产业、多主体激励问题和网络外部性等研究领域。这个项目中的受控实验室实验提供了测试博弈论者使用的各种选择和改进标准的唯一方法之一。

This project continues to study coordination problems in experimental games. It evaluates alternative theories of adaptive behavior by studying the times series of past experiments on coordination games and through the design of new games. It examines the ability of evolutionary stability and the genetic algorithm as well as individual learning models to explain the dynamics of play. The project also studies the foundations of cooperation which pervade much of the prior work on experimental coordination games. This research has made and will continue to make an important contribution to economics. Coordination games of the type studied in this project have been used to test theories about underemployment equilibria in macroeconoimcs. In industrial organization coordination problems occur in such areas of research as standardization, the entry of new firms into an oligopolistic industry, multi-agent incentive problems and network externalities. The controlled laboratory experiments in this project provide one of the only ways of testing the wide variety of selection and refinement criteria used by game theorists.