Informational Lobbying, Legislative Institutions and Campaign Contributions

9409153奥斯汀-史密斯这项研究是为了继续调查利益集团的信息作用及其与在政策过程中提供竞选捐款的联系。在研究的初始阶段，调查人员开发了一个框架，明确地将竞选捐款和游说结合在一起，从信息的角度考虑。关键的想法是，游说主要是一种信息活动。立法者必须在他们通常知之甚少的问题上做出决定(设定议程、投票等等)。然而，利益集团往往对特定立法对其特定利益的后果了如指掌；因此，立法者希望通过听取游说者的意见来了解情况。该框架的一个主要含义是，竞选捐款本身不足以激励立法者向希望通过提供重要信息影响立法者决定的团体提供访问权限。原因是立法者有动力听取那些与他或她有相同政策偏好的团体的意见，无论他们可能提供了什么资金。这一发现表明，金钱和可获得性之间的关系是间接的。与“购买”访问权限不同，团体向那些政策偏好反映他们自己的候选人提供资金，这样产生的立法机构将由立法者组成，他们将基于信息理由寻找他们，而不考虑任何竞选捐款。从这个角度来看，这些问题涉及到团体如何决定向谁捐款，以及竞选支出如何影响选民的投票行为。将要进行的研究解决了这两个问题，重点是捐款的(间接)获取动机和竞选支出的广告作用。

9409153 Austen-Smith This research is to continue the investigation on the informational role of interest groups and its connection to the giving of campaign contributions on the policy process. During the initial stages of the research, the investigator developed a framework that explicitly integrates both campaign contributions and lobbying, considered in informational terms. The key idea is that lobbying is predominantly an informational activity. Legislators have to make decisions (set agendas, vote, and so forth) on issues about which they often know relatively little. Interest groups, however, are frequently well-informed about the consequences of particular legislation for their particular interests; consequently, legislators would like to become informed by listening to lobbyists. A principal implication of the framework was that campaign contributions per se do not constitute sufficient incentives for a legislator to grant access to a group that wishes to influence the legislator's decision by providing salient information. The reason is that the legislator has an incentive to listen to those groups who share his or her policy preferences, irrespective of any monies they may have given. This finding suggests the correlation between money and access is indirect. Rather than "buy" access, groups give money to candidates whose policy preferences reflect their own so that the resulting legislature will consist of legislators who will seek them out on informational grounds, irrespective of any campaign contributions. From this perspective, the issues then concern how groups decide to whom to contribute and how campaign expenditures influence voting behavior within the electorate. The research to be undertaken addresses both of these concerns, focusing on the (indirect) access motivation for contributing and on the advertising role of campaign expenditures.