Demand Uncertainty and Market Structure
Demand Uncertainty and Market Structure
批准号:
9409882
负责人:
James Peck
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1994
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1994-08-01 至 1996-08-31
中文摘要
9409882 Peck本研究将探讨需求不确定性——客户数量和类型的不确定性——对市场运作的影响。本研究分为两部分。第一部分将证明,在适当的条件下,只有那些承诺以固定价格出售的公司才能在竞争中生存下来。如果需求高于预期,公司会对部分客户实行定量配给,而不是提高价格。这种“价格竞争”已经被以前的作者假设;本研究试图对此作出解释。研究的第二部分将展示需求不确定性的本质如何影响制造商-零售商关系的效率。具体来说,它将比较转售价格维持(零售价格由制造商设定)与完全竞争零售市场。与完全竞争的零售市场相比,转售价格维持为制造商提供了更高的利润,为消费者提供了更高的效用。在这些条件下,完全零售竞争是“破坏性的”,因为它比维持转售价格产生更低的经济福利。这个项目很重要,因为它试图解释零售市场的组织。这项研究的结果有望让我们更好地理解定价“过程”,超越传统的价格竞争观点。
英文摘要
9409882 Peck This research will explore the impact of demand uncertainity- -uncertainty about the number and types of customers-- on the workings of markets. The study is divided into two parts. The first part will demonstrate that, under suitable conditions, the only firms who survive competition are those who commit to sell at a fixed price. If demand is higher than expected, firms ration some of their customers rather than increase their prices. This "price competition" has been assumed by previous authors; this study attempts to explain it. The second part of the study will show how the nature of demand uncertainty can effect the efficiency of manufacturer-retailer relationships. Specifically, it will compare resale price maintenance, where the retail price is set by the manufacturer, to a perfectly competitive retail market. Conditions will be derived under which resale price maintenance provides higher profits to the manufacturer and higher utility to the customers than a perfectly competitive retail market. Under these conditions, perfect retail competition is "destructive" in the sense of yielding lower economic welfare than resale price maintenance. The project is important because it attempts to explian the organization of retail markets. The results from the study promise to give us a better understanding of pricing "processes" beyond the traditional view of price competition.
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专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Collaborative Research: Contingent Reasoning and Bayesian Updating in Games of Incomplete Information: An Experimental Analysis
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批准号:1031101
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$19.17万
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财政年份:2010
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负责人:James Peck
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依托单位:
Investment Dynamics with Common and Private Values: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
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批准号:0417352
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项目类别:Continuing grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2004
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负责人:James Peck
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依托单位:
海外基金