Collaborative Research: Multi-Unit Demand Auctions

多单位需求(单边)拍卖的最新理论发展清楚地表明，统一价格拍卖产生了需求减少(减价)的激励，导致低效结果。相比之下，将维克里拍卖规则扩展到多单位需求拍卖在理论上有望恢复经济效率，并在各种情况下相对于统一价格拍卖提高预期收入。这些预测在很大程度上取决于投标人认识到统一价格拍卖中需求减少的战略机遇并做出适当反应，并遵循维克里拍卖中的“真诚”投标策略。本研究的目的是从理论和实验两个方面探讨多单位需求拍卖中的行为。实验将集中在统一价格拍卖中，当投标人的需求相等和不平等，且竞争或多或少激烈时，投标人减少需求的程度，以及由此产生的低效和收入影响。Vickrey拍卖实验将集中于不同实施规则的效果，以使用相对透明、开放的英式时钟拍卖程序和可能在现场环境中被证明更容易处理的密封竞价版本的时钟拍卖程序来诱导真诚竞价。将在互动和非互动(与计算机化投标人的游戏)环境中研究行为，后者旨在消除与其他玩家学习战略性行为的行动相关的“噪音”。理论工作将提供基准模型，以评估实验结果，并确定在不同拍卖机构下在理论上存在效率和收入之间权衡的条件。多单位需求拍卖中的工作很重要，因为(I)大多数拍卖涉及多单位需求，以及(Ii)从单位需求拍卖中获得的一些见解无法适用于多单位需求。随着最近频谱拍卖的设计和实施，其中许多问题已经走到了前列。

Recent theoretical developments in multi-unit demand (one sided) auctions make it clear that uniform price auctions create an incentive for demand reductions (bid shaving) resulting in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, extensions of the Vickrey auction rule to multi-unit demand auctions promise, in theory, to restore economic efficiency and to raise expected revenue relative to uniform price auctions under a wide variety of circumstances. These predictions rest critically on bidders recognizing and responding appropriately to the strategic opportunities for demand reductions in uniform price auctions and following a "sincere" bidding strategy in the Vickrey auctions. The purpose of this research is to explore behavior in multi-unit demand auctions through both theory and experiments. The experiments will focus on the extent to which bidders reduce demand, and the resulting inefficiencies and revenue impact, in uniform price auctions when bidders have equal and unequal demands and with more or less intense competition. Vickrey auction experiments will focus on the effects of different implementation rules for inducing sincere bidding using a relatively transparent, open English clock auction procedure and a sealed bid version of the clock procedure that may prove more tractable in field settings. Behavior will be studied in both interactive and non-interactive (games against computerized bidders) environments with the latter designed to eliminate the "noise" associated with other players' actions on learning to behave strategically. Theoretical work will provide benchmark models against which to evaluate the experimental outcomes and to identify conditions where there are tradeoffs in theory, between efficiency and revenue under the different auction institutions. Work in multi-unit demand auctions is important because (i) most auctions involve multi-unit demands and (ii) a number of insights obtained from unit demand auctions fail to hold with multi-un it demands. Many of these issues have come to the forefront-with the design and implementation of the recent spectrum auctions.