Agenda Power in Democratic Legislatures

在这个建议中，我们描述了研究议程权力的性质和后果，在民主立法机构。 我们特别关注两个（组）问题。 第一组问题是：议程权力是一种“自然垄断”，人们应该经常看到它掌握在政府或多数人手中吗？我们是否应该普遍地期望一群立法者作为一个“立法卡特尔”，将议程权力集中在他们所选择的领导人手中，而排除那些不在小组内的人？或者是中间派立法者或团体的地位优势压倒了程序权力，因此无论哪个政党或联盟执政，政策结果都是中间派的？ 第二组问题是：如果议程权力被一个执政（政府或多数）联盟卡特尔化，会有什么可观察到的后果？由执政联盟制定的议程与由多数票直接在议会上制定的议程有何不同？对公共政策有何影响？我们认为，议程权力的卡特尔化在世界各地的民主国家中普遍存在。 我们表明，卡特尔议程权力的后果在消极方面（使事情远离立法议程）比积极方面（推动法案最终通过）更引人注目。 我们预计执政联盟在防止大多数联盟不喜欢的法案出现在会议议程上方面的成功率不会有什么变化，而且我们在调查的案例中也没有发现什么变化。 同质联盟、异质联盟和中间联盟在消极议程控制方面都有近乎完美的记录。 相比之下，执政联盟的异质性在理论上和经验上似乎都与联盟积极议程的规模有关：更同质的联盟试图通过并成功通过更多法案。 换句话说，政党执政在消极议程控制上不是“有条件的”，只有在积极议程控制上才是“有条件的”。为了完成这个项目，我们计划收集一个关于立法组织和决策的多室跨国数据集。 我们感兴趣的主要数据是：（1）与制定会议议程有关的投票（或其他相关信息，如委员会的反对意见）;（2）最终通过法案的投票。 其次是（3）在推行政府或多数党的议程时使用政党资源，（4）中间投票，无论是那些确定辩论条件和规则的投票，还是那些关于实质性修正案的投票，以及（5）确定回归政策，如果有的话。

In this proposal, we describe research into the nature and consequences of agenda power in democratic legislatures. We focus in particular on two (sets of) questions. The first set asks: is agenda power a "natural monopoly" that one should expect routinely to see in the hands of the government or majority?; should we generally expect a group of legislators to act as a "legislative cartel" that concentrates agenda power in the hands of their chosen leaders and excludes those not in the group?; or do the positional advantages of the median legislator or group trump procedural powers, so that policy outcomes are centrist, regardless of which party or coalition is in government? The second set asks: what would the observable consequences be if agenda power is cartelized by a governing (government or majority) coalition?; how would agendas constructed by governing coalitions differ from agendas constructed directly on the floor by majority votes and what would be the effect on public policy? We believe that the cartelization of agenda power is generally to be expected in democracies around the world. We show that the consequences of cartelizing agenda power are far more striking on the negative side (keeping things off the legislative agenda) than they are on the positive side (pushing bills through to final passage). We expect little variation in governing coalitions' success at preventing bills that majorities of those coalitions dislike from appearing on the floor agenda, and we find little variation empirically in the cases that we survey. Homogeneous coalitions, heterogeneous coalitions, and in-between coalitions all compile near-perfect records in terms of negative agenda control. In contrast, the heterogeneity of the governing coalition should theoretically and does empirically seem to covary with the size of the coalitions' positive agenda: more homogeneous coalitions attempt to pass, and succeed in passing, more bills. To put this conclusion in another way, party governing is not "conditoinal" when it comes to negative agenda control, only when it comes to positive agenda control. To complete this project, we plan to assemble a multi-chamber cross-national dataset on legislative organization and decisionmaking. The primary data in which we are interested are (1) votes (or other pertinent information, such as committee dissents) that bear on the setting of the floor agenda: and (2) votes on final passage of bills. Of secondary interest are (3) use of party resources in pursuing the agenda of the government or majority party, (4) intermediate votes, either those setting the terms and rules of debate on the floor or those concerning substantive amendments, and (5) identification of the reversionary policy, if any.