NSCC/SA: Collaborative Research: Experimental Analysis of Alternative Models of Conflict Bargaining

该奖项由国家安全、冲突和合作竞赛的社会和行为维度资助，该竞赛是国家科学基金会和国防部之间的合资企业。将讨价还价模型应用到国家间冲突的研究中，已经产生了大量关于国家之间为什么会发生冲突的见解，但它没有解决为什么理性的领导人会选择冲突，如果战斗会导致他们在谈判解决中可以避免的成本。大多数冲突的讨价还价模型都假设领导者对预期成本和收益非常敏感，因此他们不会犯决策错误。这个项目探讨了一个讨价还价模型，在这个模型中，参与者不被假设为完美的决策者，也不相信他们的对手是完美的决策者。相反，领导者被认为对预期成本和收益不敏感，并且相信对手的不敏感。因此，玩家可能会在他们的游戏方式中犯错误，并可能表现出与标准博弈论预测相比的次优行为。将进行一系列实验室实验，以评估这种模型在多大程度上可以解释实验中发生的决策错误和次优结果的类型。实验还将检验让玩家接受领导力训练的结果，以及大的预期回报（高风险）如何影响决策。

This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense. The application of bargaining models to the study of interstate conflict has produced a large number of insights regarding why states fight, but it leaves unsolved the puzzle as to why rational leaders would choose conflict if fighting incurs costs they could avoid in a negotiated settlement. Most bargaining models of conflict assume leaders are perfectly sensitive to expected costs and benefits, and as a result, they do not make decision errors. This project explores a bargaining model in which players are not assumed to be perfect decision makers, nor to believe their opponents are perfect decision makers. Instead, leaders are assumed to be somewhat insensitive to expected costs and benefits and have beliefs about regarding the insensitivity of their opponents. As a result, players may make mistakes in the way they play and may exhibit suboptimal behavior relative to the predictions of standard game theory. A set of laboratory experiments will be undertaken to evaluate the extent to which such a model can explain the types of decision errors and suboptimal outcomes that occur experimentally. Experiments will also examine the consequences of having players trained in leadership and how large expected payoffs (high stakes) influence decision making.