Communication and Decisions

这个奖项用于经济理论的研究，该研究开发了三种不同情况下沟通如何影响经济决策的新模型。第一个项目建立并分析了群体决策的模型。其目标是预测导致群体行为两极分化的具体情况。社会学和组织行为学的研究为两极分化提供了强有力的经验证据；群体往往比个体群体成员自己做出更极端的决定。目标是预测即使在每个群体成员以理性的方式行动时导致两极分化的特定情况。第二个项目开发了一种在不对称信息博弈中沟通的一般方法，特别是信号博弈。这项研究提供了一个统一的框架，纳入了广泛的纳什均衡精炼。第三个项目以另一个书面的经验结果开始：经济决策者往往比标准理性行为者模型预测的更诚实。这个项目开发了一个新的模型，在这个模型中，个人的诚实行为是一种发出信号的方式。这项研究将心理学和社会学的见解引入了经济学家使用的正式建模框架。关于两极分化的项目应具有特别的跨学科影响。

This award funds research in economic theory that develops new models of how communication affects economic decisions in three different contexts.The first project builds and analyzes a model of group decision making. The goal is to predict the specific circumstances that lead groups to behave in a polarized manner. Research in sociology and organizational behavior has provided strong empirical evidence for polarization; groups tend to make more extreme decisions than an individual group member would make on his or her own. The goal is to predict the specific circumstances that lead to polarization even when each group member is acting in a rational way.The second project develops a general approach to communication in games of asymmetric information, especially signaling games. This research provides a unifying framework that incorporates a wide range of Nash equilibrium refinements.The third project starts with another documented empirical result: economic decision makers are frequently more honest than would be predicted by the standard rational actor model. This project develops a new model in which individuals behave honestly as a way to signal.This research brings insights from psychology and sociology into the formal modeling framework used by economists. The project on polarization should have particular interdisciplinary impact.