Doctoral Dissertation Research: Testing the Intrinsic Benefit Model of Cultural Signaling

约瑟夫·加拉斯凯维奇亚利桑那州冈田宗辅大学在许多社交活动中，确定他人的素质是很重要的，例如能力、忠诚度或可信度。信号传递理论关注的是这些情况。发送者拥有一种他们知道但其他人看不到的内在特征。发送者和接收者之间存在利益冲突，因为发送者受益于被更好地感知，而接收者想要准确地确定发送者的内在特征。在这种情况下，只有当质量较高的信号的产生成本低于质量较低的信号时，信号才是可靠的。作者提出了文化信号传递模式，在该模式中，发送者可以从参与文化行为中获得内在利益。内在利益降低了发送者实践文化行为的净成本，这将导致质量和信号成本之间的反向关联。例如，如果某人更致力于一项社会事业，S/他可以从为该事业做出贡献中获得更多内在利益(例如，感觉良好)。这一内在利益可以弥补捐款的实际成本；因此，对于那些更致力于捐款的人来说，捐款实际上更便宜。通过这种方式，文化行为可以作为理想的内在品质的信号。内在收益模型做出了以下预测。首先，当发送者具有高水平的相应特征时，他们更愿意支付更高的成本来执行文化行为。其次，当发送者执行文化行为的代价似乎很高时，文化行为将被视为内在质量的信号，而潜在地激励文化行为的信号并没有显著的外在好处。第三，文化行为的可见性应该影响文化行为作为信号发挥作用的程度。对于发送者来说，文化行为的高能见度可以使其更具吸引力，但对于接受者来说，高能见度可以使发送者的外部动机更加突出。该项目将进行三个实验来验证预测。前两个实验将集中在购买一辆电动汽车作为环境承诺的信号。第三个实验将重点放在慈善捐赠作为社会偏好的信号上。更广泛的影响内在利益模型的主要优势是，它提供了一个通用的、易于使用的框架，允许将信号传递理论应用于不同的社会学兴趣现象，同时使用一个在外行中被广泛接受的假设。该提案认为，在组织研究(特别是组织与其受众之间的互动)、集团内部动态(合作和竞争)以及文化资本研究方面的应用可能会从内在利益模式中获得巨大好处。这个模型可以为许多看似非理性或文化决定的行为提供一个基于节俭的理性选择的解释。此外，它还可以帮助开发通过操纵信号利益来促进社会有益行为的技术。例如，研究人员认为，许多看似不适应的行为都是由信号发送的需求驱动的--我们的研究不仅可以为此类行为提供新的见解，而且还可以通过减少信号发送的好处来帮助减少此类行为。

SES-1404371Joseph GalaskiewiczSosuke OkadaUniversity of ArizonaIn many social interactions, it is important to determine qualities of others, such as competence, loyalty, or trustworthiness. Signaling theory focuses on these situations. The senders possess an internal characteristic which they aware of, but is unobservable to others. There is a conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver, as the sender benefits from being perceived in a better light, whereas the receiver wants to accurately determine the sender's internal characteristic. Under this condition, a signal will be reliable only when the cost of producing the signal is lower for those with higher quality than for those with lower quality. The co-PI proposes the model of cultural signaling where the sender can enjoy intrinsic benefits from engaging in a cultural act. The intrinsic benefit reduces the net cost of practicing the cultural act for the sender, which will result in the inverse association between quality and signaling cost. For example, if someone is more committed to a social cause, s/he can gain more intrinsic benefit (feeling good, for example) from contributing to the cause. This intrinsic benefit can make up for the actual cost of the contribution; therefore the contribution is effectively less expensive for those who are more committed to it. This way, cultural acts can function as signals of desirable internal qualities. The intrinsic benefit model makes the following predictions. First, senders are more willing to pay higher cost to perform a cultural act when they have a high level of the corresponding characteristic. Second, a cultural act will be perceived as a signal of intrinsic quality when it appears to be costly for the sender to perform the cultural act, and there are no salient extrinsic benefits from signaling that are potentially motivating the cultural act. Third, the visibility of a cultural act should affect how well the cultural act can function as a signal. For the sender, high visibility of a cultural act can make it more attractive, but for the receiver, high visibility can make the sender's extrinsic motivation more salient. The project will conduct three experiments to test the predictions. The first two experiments will focus on purchase of an electronic vehicle as the signal of environmental commitment. The third experiment will focus on charitable giving as a signal of social preference. Broader ImpactsThe main advantage of the intrinsic benefit model is that it provides a general, easy-to-use framework which will allow applying signaling theory across diverse phenomena of sociological interest while using an assumption which is widely accepted among laypersons. The proposal argues that applications in organizational studies (in particular, the interactions between organizations and their audience), intragroup dynamics (both cooperation and competition), and research on cultural capital can potentially greatly benefit from the intrinsic benefit model. This model can provide a parsimonious rational-choice based explanation for many behaviors that are seemingly irrational or culturally determined. In addition, it can also help develop techniques for promoting socially beneficial behaviors through manipulating signaling benefits. For example, the investigators argue that many seemingly maladaptive behaviors are motivated by the need for signaling -- not only can our research shed new insight into such behaviors, but it can also help reduce such behaviors by reducing signaling benefits.