Do we see adverse selection in whole life and term life insurance : from economical and actuarial point ?

本研究提供了与寿险市场存在逆向选择一致的经验证据。对日本一家寿险公司发行的160多万份自动续期寿险合同的微观数据分析表明，由于医疗和其他选择，自动续期寿险(续期前)既不能识别逆向选择，也不能识别道德风险问题。然而，在续期后的10年里，确实发生了逆向选择和道德风险。考虑到价格竞争加剧，可能需要对定期人寿保险的自动续期进行审查，以使投保人平均分担财务负担，并确保人寿保险公司的财务稳健。

This study provides empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the life insurance market. An analysis of micro data from more than 1.6 million automatic renewal term life insurance contracts, issued by a Japanese life insurance company, reveals that owing to medical and other selections, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard problems could not be recognized with an automatic renewal term life insurance (before renewal). However, after the renewal, adverse selection and moral hazard did occur in the subsequent 10 years. Considering intensifying price competition, a review of automatic renewal of term life insurance may be required for equal distribution of the financial burden amongst policyholders and for the financial soundness of life insurance companies.