Doctoral Dissertation Research: Testing the Intrinsic Benefit Model of Cultural Signaling

博士论文研究：测试文化信号的内在效益模型

• 批准号: 1404371
• 负责人: Joseph Galaskiewicz
• 金额: $ 0.65万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-08-01 至 2017-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1404371&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Testing; Intrinsic

SES-1404371Joseph GalaskiewiczSosuke OkadaUniversity of ArizonaIn many social interactions, it is important to determine qualities of others, such as competence, loyalty, or trustworthiness. Signaling theory focuses on these situations. The senders possess an internal characteristic which they aware of, but is unobservable to others. There is a conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver, as the sender benefits from being perceived in a better light, whereas the receiver wants to accurately determine the sender's internal characteristic. Under this condition, a signal will be reliable only when the cost of producing the signal is lower for those with higher quality than for those with lower quality. The co-PI proposes the model of cultural signaling where the sender can enjoy intrinsic benefits from engaging in a cultural act. The intrinsic benefit reduces the net cost of practicing the cultural act for the sender, which will result in the inverse association between quality and signaling cost. For example, if someone is more committed to a social cause, s/he can gain more intrinsic benefit (feeling good, for example) from contributing to the cause. This intrinsic benefit can make up for the actual cost of the contribution; therefore the contribution is effectively less expensive for those who are more committed to it. This way, cultural acts can function as signals of desirable internal qualities. The intrinsic benefit model makes the following predictions. First, senders are more willing to pay higher cost to perform a cultural act when they have a high level of the corresponding characteristic. Second, a cultural act will be perceived as a signal of intrinsic quality when it appears to be costly for the sender to perform the cultural act, and there are no salient extrinsic benefits from signaling that are potentially motivating the cultural act. Third, the visibility of a cultural act should affect how well the cultural act can function as a signal. For the sender, high visibility of a cultural act can make it more attractive, but for the receiver, high visibility can make the sender's extrinsic motivation more salient. The project will conduct three experiments to test the predictions. The first two experiments will focus on purchase of an electronic vehicle as the signal of environmental commitment. The third experiment will focus on charitable giving as a signal of social preference. Broader ImpactsThe main advantage of the intrinsic benefit model is that it provides a general, easy-to-use framework which will allow applying signaling theory across diverse phenomena of sociological interest while using an assumption which is widely accepted among laypersons. The proposal argues that applications in organizational studies (in particular, the interactions between organizations and their audience), intragroup dynamics (both cooperation and competition), and research on cultural capital can potentially greatly benefit from the intrinsic benefit model. This model can provide a parsimonious rational-choice based explanation for many behaviors that are seemingly irrational or culturally determined. In addition, it can also help develop techniques for promoting socially beneficial behaviors through manipulating signaling benefits. For example, the investigators argue that many seemingly maladaptive behaviors are motivated by the need for signaling -- not only can our research shed new insight into such behaviors, but it can also help reduce such behaviors by reducing signaling benefits.

SES-1404371约瑟夫GalaskiewiczSosuke Okada亚利桑那大学在许多社会交往中，重要的是要确定他人的素质，如能力，忠诚度或可信赖性。信号理论关注这些情况。他们有一个内在的特点，他们知道，但别人看不到。在发送者和接收者之间存在利益冲突，因为发送者从更好的角度被感知中受益，而接收者希望准确地确定发送者的内部特征。在这种情况下，只有当高质量信号的产生成本低于低质量信号的产生成本时，信号才是可靠的。 共同PI提出了文化信号的模式，发送者可以从参与文化行为中享受内在的好处。内在利益降低了发送者实施文化行为的净成本，这将导致质量和信号成本之间的负相关关系。例如，如果某人更致力于一项社会事业，他/她可以从为这项事业做出贡献中获得更多的内在利益（例如感觉良好）。这种内在的利益可以弥补贡献的实际成本，因此，对于那些更致力于贡献的人来说，贡献的成本实际上更低。内在效益模型作出以下预测。第一，当个体的文化特征水平较高时，他们更愿意付出较高的成本来实施文化行为。第二，文化行为将被视为一个信号的内在质量时，它似乎是昂贵的发送者执行的文化行为，并没有显着的外在利益，是潜在的激励文化行为的信号。第三，文化行为的可见性应该影响文化行为作为信号的功能。对于发送者来说，文化行为的高可见性可以使其更具吸引力，但对于接收者来说，高可见性可以使发送者的外在动机更加突出。该项目将进行三个实验来测试预测。前两个实验将侧重于购买电动汽车作为环保承诺的信号。第三个实验将关注慈善捐赠作为社会偏好的信号。内在利益模型的主要优点是它提供了一个通用的、易于使用的框架，允许将信号理论应用于社会学感兴趣的各种现象，同时使用一个在外行中被广泛接受的假设。该提案认为，在组织研究（特别是，组织和他们的观众之间的相互作用），集团内的动态（合作和竞争），和文化资本的研究中的应用程序可能会大大受益于内在效益模型。这个模型可以为许多看似非理性或文化决定的行为提供一个基于理性选择的简约解释。此外，它还可以帮助开发通过操纵信号益处来促进社会有益行为的技术。例如，研究人员认为，许多看似适应不良的行为是由信号的需要所激发的-我们的研究不仅可以对此类行为提供新的见解，而且还可以通过减少信号益处来帮助减少此类行为。