Political Economy of Institutional Change

本研究以宪政政治经济学和公共选择理论为工具，建立了制度变迁的政治经济学模型，首先对制度变迁的政治经济学文献以及社会经济结构变迁与制度变迁的关系进行了综述，并从三个方面对制度变迁的博弈论模型进行了拓展：1.博弈论模型在小鸡博弈、协调博弈和囚徒困境中的扩展。2.研究不确定性下实现制度变迁的条件。3.代理人组成的模型变化。研究影响制度变迁前景的条件，引入以下方面的博弈论制度变迁模型：制度的固定，社会经济结构的变化，参与公共决策的代理人的变化。研究联系宪法改革的论点和寻租模型。前者是由主张一致同意的宪政政治经济学发展而来的，后者是由积极公共选择学者提出的。最后，本文从制度变迁背后的禁止性制度的差异方面对美日两国的制度变迁进行了比较。

This research develops political economic models of institutional changes using tools of constitutional political economy and public choice.At first, the research surveys the political economic literatures on the institutional changes and the relation between socio-economic structural changes and institutional changes.Extensions of game theoretic models of institutional changes are made in three ways : 1. Extensions of game theoretic models in a chicken game and a co-ordination game situation as well as a prisoners' dilemma one. 2. Investigations of conditions for the realization of institutional changes in respect to an uncertainty. 3. Variations of models with regard to the composition of agents.Investigations of the conditions which influence the prospects for institutional changes are made introducing following aspects to game theoretic institutional change models ; the fixation of institutions, socio-economic structural changes, variations of agents involved in the public decision making.The research links constitutional reform arguments and rent-seeking models. The former is developed by constitutional political economy which advocates an unanimous consent, and the latter is argued by Positive public choice scholars Finally, comparisons between the US and Japan institutional changes are made in respect of the differences of underlying prohibited institutions.