POLITICO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH IN THEDIVERSITY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

排他性、自由裁量权和合作性是日本经济政策决策和政策管理体制的主要特征。官僚、工业和饮食政策部落之间的铁三角关系随着每个局的管辖而形成。他们持有共同的信息，通过包括人员交换在内的长期互动，形成特定的关系资产。官僚在产业政策中具有自由裁量的主动性，企业作为一个产业整体合作地接受了他们的“道德说服”。在这种情况下，监管改革也以自由裁量和官僚主义主导的方式进行。发达国家在20世纪80年代及以后实行同步性管制改革政策的原因是原自然垄断行业的技术变革、管制与竞争经济理论的发展以及亏损公营公司私有化的需要。由于经济活动的全球化和国际经济的统一，管制政策的国际差异对各国的经济绩效产生了巨大的影响。如果一个行业承担了对另一个行业的保护政策的成本，那么由于经济活动的全球化，它的竞争条件就会受到严重损害，放松管制就会上升为一个政治议程。国际制度竞争是通过政治企业家围绕改变或保持现有规制政策的政治竞争而发展起来的。国际制度竞争并不一定意味着各国放松管制政策的趋同。管制改革的差异和趋同也取决于工业的国际联系程度、政治机构的结构和政府结构的集中或分散。

Exclusionism, discretion and cooperation are main features for the Japanese system of decision-making and policy management in economic policy. The iron-triangle connections of bureaucrats, industries and diet policy tribes are formed along with the jurisdiction of each bureau. Holding common information they form relation specific assets by long-run interaction including personnel exchange. Bureaucrats take the discretionary initiative in the industrial policy, and firms as a whole industry cooperatively accept their 'moral persuasion'. Regulation reforms also are performed by the discretional and bureaucracy-led manner under these circumstances.The reasons for synchronized regulation reform policies in developed countries in 1980s and after are the technological change in former natural monopoly industries, developments of the economic theory of regulation and competition and the needs for privatization of public corporations in deficits.Because of the globalization of economic activities and the international economic unification, the international difference of regulation policies has the huge effect on the economic performance of each country. If one industry should bear the cost of a protective policy for another industry, its competitivecondition is severely damaged through the globalization of economic activities, and the deregulation is risen up as a political agenda.International institutional competition grows through the political competition around changing/keeping the existing regulation policy by political entrepreneurs.The international institutional competition does not necessarily mean the convergence of the deregulation policy in each country. The divergence and convergence of regulation reforms also depends a degree of international linkage of a industry, structures of political institutions and centralization or decentralization of government structures.