Towards a New Fiscal Contract.Taxes, Inflation, and Politics in Italy (ca. 1960-1990)

迈向新的财政契约。意大利的税收、通货膨胀和政治（约 1960-1990 年）

• 批准号: 531885424
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Alexander Nützenadel
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/531885424?language=en
• 关键词: Towards; New; Fiscal; Contract.Taxes; Inflation

Modern taxation provides governments with the resources to administer public goods, enables income and wealth redistribution, and is a fundamental tool for regulating the economy. But why do states implement modern taxes (i.e. personal income tax, general sales tax, social contributions)? Comparative historical research has pointed to the effects of the World Wars, but empirical evidence is based primarily on the US and the UK, while different patterns can be observed in many continental European countries. Italy provides a fitting case study to investigate this alternative path. Between 1973 and 1983, Italian tax revenue increased from 23 percent to 34 percent of GDP (OECD data), primarily thanks to the 1974 tax reform introducing a modern personal income tax. Our project intends to look at the role of political competition concerning the tax reform of 1974 in order to explain the rise of a modern tax state in Italy. We draw upon the political-economic framework of the fiscal contract, based on the idea that the fiscal system is the implicit product of the bargaining power of different interest groups, such as politicians, industrialists, trade unions, and experts. Our approach considers both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of modern taxation. First, following a history-of-knowledge approach, we look at the circulation of new tax ideas on personal income taxation from the US and the UK to Italy in the 1960s. Which actors advocated the adoption of a new form of taxation? How was the model adapted in the Italian context? Second, by drawing upon tax data at the provincial level (95 units for 20 years), we investigate the quantitative facet of the tax reform. Who paid for the reform? Who benefitted? Third, we combine the findings from part 1 and part 2 to sketch out the political terms of the new fiscal contract introduced by the reform, relying on qualitative evidence from the archives. What were the terms of the contract? Which actors were involved? We intend to argue that the new fiscal contract was an important factor to reach a political equilibrium in a time of rising social and economic instability. The new combination of high taxation on workers and particularistic welfare spending helped to keep in power the leading Italian party of the time, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Furthermore, by relying on the political-economic framework of the fiscal contract, our findings will also help shed light on the experiences of other countries in Continental Europe that modernised their tax system after the 1970s (Spain, Portugal).

现代税收为政府提供了管理公共产品的资源，使收入和财富重新分配成为可能，是调节经济的基本工具。但是，为什么国家实施现代税收（即个人所得税，一般销售税，社会贡献）？比较历史研究指出了世界大战的影响，但经验证据主要基于美国和英国，而在许多欧洲大陆国家可以观察到不同的模式。意大利提供了一个合适的案例来研究这一替代路径：1973年至1983年，意大利税收收入从GDP的23%增加到34%（经合组织数据），这主要归功于1974年引入现代个人所得税的税收改革。我们的项目旨在研究1974年税收改革中政治竞争的作用，以解释现代税收国家在意大利的兴起。我们借鉴了财政契约的政治经济框架，基于这样一种观点，即财政制度是不同利益集团（如政治家、工业家、工会和专家）讨价还价能力的隐含产物。我们的方法考虑了现代税收的定性和定量两个方面。首先，按照知识史的方法，我们看看在20世纪60年代从美国和英国到意大利的个人所得税的新税收理念的流通。哪些行为者主张采用新的税收形式？在意大利的情况下，该模式是如何适应的？其次，利用省级税收数据（95个单位，20年），我们研究了税收改革的数量方面。谁为改革买单？谁受益？第三，我们联合收割机结合第一部分和第二部分的发现，根据档案中的定性证据，勾勒出改革引入的新财政契约的政治条款。合同的条款是什么？有哪些演员参与？我们打算论证，在社会和经济不稳定加剧的时期，新的财政契约是达成政治均衡的重要因素。对工人的高税收和特殊福利支出的新组合帮助当时的意大利主要政党民主基督党（Democrazia Cristiana）保持执政。此外，通过依赖财政契约的政治经济框架，我们的研究结果也将有助于阐明20世纪70年代后欧洲大陆其他国家（西班牙，葡萄牙）税收制度现代化的经验。