Towards a New Fiscal Contract.Taxes, Inflation, and Politics in Italy (ca. 1960-1990)

现代税收为政府提供管理公共产品的资源，实现收入和财富的再分配，是调节经济的基本工具。但是，为什么各州要实行现代税收（即个人所得税、一般销售税、社会缴款）呢？比较历史研究指出了世界大战的影响，但经验证据主要基于美国和英国，而在许多欧洲大陆国家可以观察到不同的模式。意大利为研究这一替代路径提供了一个合适的案例研究。从1973年到1983年，意大利的税收收入从GDP的23%增加到34%（经合组织数据），这主要归功于1974年引入现代个人所得税的税制改革。我们的项目旨在研究1974年税收改革中政治竞争的作用，以解释意大利现代税收国家的兴起。我们借鉴了财政契约的政治经济框架，其基础是财政制度是不同利益集团（如政治家、实业家、工会和专家）议价能力的隐性产物。我们的方法考虑了现代税收的定性和定量两个方面。首先，按照知识史的方法，我们研究了20世纪60年代美国和英国向意大利传播的个人所得税新税收理念。哪些行为者主张采用一种新的税收形式？该模式如何适应意大利的环境？其次，通过利用省级（95个单位，20年）的税收数据，我们调查了税收改革的定量方面。谁为改革买单？谁受益?第三，我们将第一部分和第二部分的研究结果结合起来，根据档案中的定性证据，勾勒出改革引入的新财政契约的政治条款。合同的条款是什么？哪些演员参与其中？我们打算指出，在社会和经济不稳定加剧的时期，新的财政契约是实现政治平衡的一个重要因素。对工人征收高额税收和特殊福利支出的新组合，帮助当时意大利的主要政党——基督教民主党（DC）保住了政权。此外，通过财政契约的政治经济框架，我们的研究结果还将有助于揭示欧洲大陆其他国家在20世纪70年代后实现税收制度现代化的经验（西班牙、葡萄牙）。

Modern taxation provides governments with the resources to administer public goods, enables income and wealth redistribution, and is a fundamental tool for regulating the economy. But why do states implement modern taxes (i.e. personal income tax, general sales tax, social contributions)? Comparative historical research has pointed to the effects of the World Wars, but empirical evidence is based primarily on the US and the UK, while different patterns can be observed in many continental European countries. Italy provides a fitting case study to investigate this alternative path. Between 1973 and 1983, Italian tax revenue increased from 23 percent to 34 percent of GDP (OECD data), primarily thanks to the 1974 tax reform introducing a modern personal income tax. Our project intends to look at the role of political competition concerning the tax reform of 1974 in order to explain the rise of a modern tax state in Italy. We draw upon the political-economic framework of the fiscal contract, based on the idea that the fiscal system is the implicit product of the bargaining power of different interest groups, such as politicians, industrialists, trade unions, and experts. Our approach considers both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of modern taxation. First, following a history-of-knowledge approach, we look at the circulation of new tax ideas on personal income taxation from the US and the UK to Italy in the 1960s. Which actors advocated the adoption of a new form of taxation? How was the model adapted in the Italian context? Second, by drawing upon tax data at the provincial level (95 units for 20 years), we investigate the quantitative facet of the tax reform. Who paid for the reform? Who benefitted? Third, we combine the findings from part 1 and part 2 to sketch out the political terms of the new fiscal contract introduced by the reform, relying on qualitative evidence from the archives. What were the terms of the contract? Which actors were involved? We intend to argue that the new fiscal contract was an important factor to reach a political equilibrium in a time of rising social and economic instability. The new combination of high taxation on workers and particularistic welfare spending helped to keep in power the leading Italian party of the time, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Furthermore, by relying on the political-economic framework of the fiscal contract, our findings will also help shed light on the experiences of other countries in Continental Europe that modernised their tax system after the 1970s (Spain, Portugal).