Financial System and Corporate Governance in Japan and East Asia

日本和东亚的金融体系和公司治理

基本信息

批准号：
14530045
负责人：
TERANISHI Juro
金额：
$ 2.56万
依托单位：
Hitotsubashi University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2002
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2002 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-14530045/
关键词：
Corporate Governance Financial System Main Bank Family Control Executive Compensation Business Group Asian Financial Crises Market Competition

项目摘要

This research investigates corporate governance in Japan and other East Asian countries. First, regarding research on Japan, we investigate the effectiveness of the role of the main bank which has been regarded as corporate governance of Japanese firms. The empirical results do not support the conventional view that main banks enhance the management efficiency in particular in the manufacturing industry even during the boom period of 1970s and 1980s. Instead, we find that market competition has consistently contributed to efficient corporate governance. We argue that banks could not be good monitors for lack of incentives due to regulations and the comprehensive network to prevent bank failures. Second, regarding research on other East Asian countries, we investigate corporate governance of family firms that are prevalent in those countries. We find that the ownership is very concentrated in the hands of family members. In addition, the controlling shareholders not only act as top managers but also dominate the board of directors. This structure does not change significantly after the crisis. The ownership structure may enhance the controlling shareholders to expropriate corporate assets at the expenses of minority shareholders. Internal markets that are created in particular inside family owned business groups appear to facilitate resource tunneling.

这项研究调查了日本和其他东亚国家的公司治理。首先，关于日本的研究，我们调查了主要银行作用的有效性，该角色被视为日本公司的公司治理。经验结果不支持传统观点，即即使在1970年代和1980年代的繁荣时期，主要银行也可以提高管理行业的管理效率。取而代之的是，我们发现市场竞争一直促进了有效的公司治理。我们认为，由于法规和防止银行失败的全面网络，银行不能成为良好的监视器。其次，关于对其他东亚国家的研究，我们调查了这些国家普遍存在的家族企业的公司治理。我们发现，所有权非常集中在家庭成员手中。此外，控制股东不仅是高级管理人员，而且还主导董事会。危机后这种结构不会发生重大变化。所有权结构可以增强控制股东以少数股东的费用征收公司资产。特别是在家族拥有的业务团体内部创建的内部市场似乎有助于资源隧道。