Centralization, Decentralization and Contingency Dependent Governance in the European Union: A Game Theoretical Analysis

欧盟的集权、分权和应急相关治理：博弈论分析

• 批准号: 23530383
• 负责人: SUZUKI Yutaka
• 金额: $ 1.25万
• 依托单位: Hosei University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530383/
• 关键词: ガバナンス; ゲーム理論; 契約理論; 公共経済学; 政治経済学; 欧州連合; ユーロ圏

We used a Contract& Game Theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of Eurozone Financial Governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. We derived the conditions for optimizing the EU's current allocation of authority, Monetary Centralization and Fiscal Decentralization, and found that what is effective is "contingency dependent governance" based on "relative sovereignty," where there is a division of authority as the basic structure and the main body governs the EU with leading sovereignty depending on the contingency. We focused on how financial markets put pressure on the EU in the euro crisis and how this led the EU to build more robust institutions, and approached this by applying the Coase's theory of externalities. Further, applying the framework of an entry deterrence game conceptually, we analyzed how the EU, facing challenges from the markets, moved to build fiscal and monetary institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism.

我们使用契约与博弈论框架来分析欧元区金融治理的机制，重点关注集中与分散以及激励问题。我们推导了优化欧盟现行权力配置“货币集权”和“财政分权”的条件，发现有效的是以“相对主权”为基础的“应急依赖型治理”，以权限划分为基本结构，主体根据应急情况以主导主权来治理欧盟。我们重点关注金融市场如何在欧元危机中向欧盟施加压力，以及这如何引导欧盟建立更强大的机构，并通过应用科斯的外部性理论来解决这一问题。此外，我们从概念上应用进入威慑博弈的框架，分析了欧盟如何面对市场挑战，建立欧洲稳定机制等财政和货币机构。

项目成果

Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments : A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework

非对称信息环境下的分层全球污染控制：连续型三层代理框架

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: 堀場勇夫;宮原勝一;舟島義人;鈴木豊;Kazuki Hiraga;Funashima Y.;鈴木豊
• 通讯作者: 鈴木豊

Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance : A Contract Theory Analysis

欧元区金融治理的集权、分权与激励问题：契约理论分析

• 发表时间: 2013
• 作者: 堀場勇夫;宮原勝一;舟島義人;鈴木豊;Kazuki Hiraga;Funashima Y.;鈴木豊;Funashima Y.;Kazuki Hiraga;Kazuki Hiraga;Yoshito Funashima;鈴木豊
• 通讯作者: 鈴木豊

Fiscal Relations between Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Pao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis of Development Governance

中国中央与地方政府的财政关系与“包包”、“比赛”概念：发展治理的契约理论分析

• 发表时间: 2011
• 作者: Yutaka Suzuki,"";August 17;2011;Kazuki Hiraga;Funashima Y.;Yutaka Suzuki;Funashima Y.;Kazuki Hiraga;Yutaka Suzuki;平賀一希;Yutaka Suzuki;望月正光;Yutaka Suzuki
• 通讯作者: Yutaka Suzuki

鈴木(関連）論文2 TCER Working Paper Series E-６５ (SSRN)

铃木（相关）论文 2 TCER 工作论文系列 E-65 (SSRN)

Fiscal Relations between Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis of Development Governance

中国中央与地方政府的财政关系与“包包”和“比赛”概念：发展治理的契约理论分析

• 发表时间: 2011
• 作者: Yutaka Suzuki,"";August 17;2011;Kazuki Hiraga;Funashima Y.;Yutaka Suzuki;Funashima Y.;Kazuki Hiraga;Yutaka Suzuki
• 通讯作者: Yutaka Suzuki