A Contract Theoretical Analysis of Governance

本研究课题的目的是，基于“治理”的概念可以作为内部化和解决各种外部性问题的手段这一共识，对私人、政府和超国家部门这三个领域的集中与分散问题进行调查和比较。关于私人部门的公司治理问题，我们首先提出了“非一体化”、“一体化”和“分散化”企业的比较理论。非一体化企业没有考虑管理者的决策对其他企业的外部性。虽然一体化公司将这些外部性内在化，但它们并不考虑管理人员的“私人利益”。分权公司是这两种结构的混合体。我们还从正式权力分配的角度解释了我们的模型。其次，我们考虑了双边道德风险框架，其中委托人也是生产代理人，即 ...更多信息 我们分析了静态和重复的游戏版本。我们发现，承诺问题可以通过声誉和自我执行机制来解决，并提出了一些公司治理的启示。第三，我们构建了关于持留问题的动态语境，进行了单调性分析，并从持留问题中的关键契约不完全性的观点对分析结果进行了解释。关于政府部门，我们关注的是分权改革。本文分析了人口流动背景下地方政府改善公共财政收支平衡的激励机制，指出地方政府财政收支平衡是否有效取决于人口分布状况。如果拥挤地区的居民效用因人口从稀疏地区流入而变差，拥挤地区的地方政府不仅不会做出努力，反而会恶化其公共平衡。最后，关于超国家部门（Super-National Sector，简称SGP），我们考察了欧盟委员会实施SGP、欧元区成员国遵守SGP规则的欧元区金融治理。本文追溯了欧盟委员会通过建议对法国实施惩罚以确保欧元的价值，从而反对法国违反SGP规则的过程，并在博弈论框架下对其进行了分析。少

The purpose of this project was to investigate and compare the Centralization vs. Decentralization problem in the three fields of private, government, and super-national sectors, based on a shared understanding that the concept of 'governance' can be applied as devices for internalizing and solving various externalities existing among players or actors.With regard to the corporate governance problem in the private sector, we first presented a comparative theory of "Non-Integrated", "Integrated", and "Decentralized" firms. Non-integrated firms fail to consider the externalities that managers' decisions have on other firms. While integrated firms internalize these externalities, they do not consider the "private benefits" of managers. The Decentralized Firm works as a hybrid of these two structures. We also interpreted our model from the viewpoint of allocation of formal authority. Second, we considered a bilateral moral hazard framework where the principal is also a productive agent, an … More d we analyzed static and repeated game versions. We showed that the commitment problem can be solved through a reputation and self-enforcement mechanism, and presented some implications for corporate governance. Third, we constructed a dynamic context of Holdup, performed a monotonicity analysis, and interpreted the analytical results from the viewpoint of contract incompleteness crucial in the Holdup problems.With regard to the government sector, we focused on Decentralization Reform. We analyzed the incentives for local governments to improve the public balance under resident migration, and showed that whether a local government makes its fiscal balance efficient depends on the condition of population distribution. If the residents' utility in a congested region gets worse due to the inflow of population from a sparse region, the local government in the congested region will not make efforts but rather worsen its public balance. Thus, under decentralization, local governments do not always make efforts efficiently, and the population distribution is not guaranteed to be efficient.Lastly, with regard to the Super-National Sector, we examined the Euro-zone finance governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), where the European Commission tries to enforce SGP and Euro-zone member countries are expected to keep the SGP rule. The paper traced the process how the European Commission had unsuccessfully fought against the France's deviation from the SGP rule, through their recommendation to apply the penalty in order to ensure the value of the common currency, the Euro, and then analyzed it in a game theoretic framework. Less