A Contract Theoretical Analysis of Governance

该项目的目的是调查和比较私人、政府和超国家部门三个领域的集中化与去中心化问题，基于一种共同的理解，即“治理”的概念可以作为内部化和解决参与者或行动者之间存在的各种外部性的工具。关于私营部门的公司治理问题，我们首先提出了“非整合”、“整合”和“分散”公司的比较理论。非整合企业没有考虑到管理者的决策对其他企业的外部性。虽然一体化企业内部化了这些外部性，但它们并不考虑管理人员的“私人利益”。去中心化企业是这两种结构的混合体。我们还从形式权力分配的角度来解释我们的模型。其次，我们考虑了双边道德风险框架，其中委托人也是生产代理人，然后我们分析了静态和重复的游戏版本。我们证明承诺问题可以通过声誉和自我执行机制来解决，并提出了一些对公司治理的启示。第三，构建了Holdup的动态环境，进行了单调性分析，并从Holdup问题中关键的契约不完备性的角度解释了分析结果。在政府部门，重点推进简政放权改革。本文分析了居民迁移条件下地方政府改善公共平衡的激励机制，表明地方政府财政平衡是否有效取决于人口分布条件。如果拥挤地区的居民效用因为人口从稀疏地区流入而变差，那么拥挤地区的地方政府不仅不会努力，反而会恶化公共平衡。因此，在分权的情况下，地方政府的努力并不总是有效率的，人口分布也不能保证有效率。最后，关于超国家部门，我们通过《稳定与增长公约》（SGP）考察了欧元区的金融治理，其中欧盟委员会试图执行SGP，欧元区成员国有望遵守SGP规则。本文追溯了欧盟委员会（European Commission）为确保共同货币欧元（Euro）的价值而建议实施罚款的过程，追溯了欧盟委员会（European Commission）反对法国偏离SGP规则的失败过程，并在博弈论框架下进行了分析。少

The purpose of this project was to investigate and compare the Centralization vs. Decentralization problem in the three fields of private, government, and super-national sectors, based on a shared understanding that the concept of 'governance' can be applied as devices for internalizing and solving various externalities existing among players or actors.With regard to the corporate governance problem in the private sector, we first presented a comparative theory of "Non-Integrated", "Integrated", and "Decentralized" firms. Non-integrated firms fail to consider the externalities that managers' decisions have on other firms. While integrated firms internalize these externalities, they do not consider the "private benefits" of managers. The Decentralized Firm works as a hybrid of these two structures. We also interpreted our model from the viewpoint of allocation of formal authority. Second, we considered a bilateral moral hazard framework where the principal is also a productive agent, an … More d we analyzed static and repeated game versions. We showed that the commitment problem can be solved through a reputation and self-enforcement mechanism, and presented some implications for corporate governance. Third, we constructed a dynamic context of Holdup, performed a monotonicity analysis, and interpreted the analytical results from the viewpoint of contract incompleteness crucial in the Holdup problems.With regard to the government sector, we focused on Decentralization Reform. We analyzed the incentives for local governments to improve the public balance under resident migration, and showed that whether a local government makes its fiscal balance efficient depends on the condition of population distribution. If the residents' utility in a congested region gets worse due to the inflow of population from a sparse region, the local government in the congested region will not make efforts but rather worsen its public balance. Thus, under decentralization, local governments do not always make efforts efficiently, and the population distribution is not guaranteed to be efficient.Lastly, with regard to the Super-National Sector, we examined the Euro-zone finance governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), where the European Commission tries to enforce SGP and Euro-zone member countries are expected to keep the SGP rule. The paper traced the process how the European Commission had unsuccessfully fought against the France's deviation from the SGP rule, through their recommendation to apply the penalty in order to ensure the value of the common currency, the Euro, and then analyzed it in a game theoretic framework. Less