A Contract Theoretical Analysis of Governance

这个项目的目的是调查和比较私营部门、政府部门和超国家部门三个领域的集权和分权问题，基于一个共同的理解，即“治理”的概念可以被用作内部化和解决参与者或行为者之间存在的各种外部性的手段。未整合的公司没有考虑到管理者的决策对其他公司的外部性。虽然整合后的公司将这些外部性内部化，但他们并不考虑管理者的“私人利益”。分散的公司是这两种结构的混合体。我们还从正式权力分配的角度对我们的模型进行了解释。其次，我们考虑了一个双边道德风险框架，在这个框架中，委托人也是一个生产性代理人，即…此外，我们还分析了静态和重复的游戏版本。我们证明了承诺问题可以通过声誉和自我执行机制来解决，并提出了对公司治理的一些启示。第三，我们构建了滞留的动态背景，进行了单调性分析，并从合同不完备性的角度对分析结果进行了解释。本文分析了居民迁移条件下地方政府改善公共财政平衡的动因，认为一个地方政府能否有效地实现财政平衡取决于人口分布状况。如果拥堵地区的居民效用因稀疏地区的人口流入而恶化，拥堵地区的地方政府不仅不会做出努力，反而会恶化其公共平衡。因此，在分权的情况下，地方政府并不总是有效地做出努力，人口分布也不一定是有效的。最后，关于超级国家部门，我们通过《稳定与增长公约》(SGP)考察了欧元区的财政治理，欧盟委员会试图执行SGP，欧元区成员国应该遵守SGP规则。本文追溯了欧盟委员会为确保共同货币欧元的价值而建议实施惩罚的过程，并在博弈论框架下分析了欧盟委员会反对法国偏离SGP规则的失败过程。较少

The purpose of this project was to investigate and compare the Centralization vs. Decentralization problem in the three fields of private, government, and super-national sectors, based on a shared understanding that the concept of 'governance' can be applied as devices for internalizing and solving various externalities existing among players or actors.With regard to the corporate governance problem in the private sector, we first presented a comparative theory of "Non-Integrated", "Integrated", and "Decentralized" firms. Non-integrated firms fail to consider the externalities that managers' decisions have on other firms. While integrated firms internalize these externalities, they do not consider the "private benefits" of managers. The Decentralized Firm works as a hybrid of these two structures. We also interpreted our model from the viewpoint of allocation of formal authority. Second, we considered a bilateral moral hazard framework where the principal is also a productive agent, an … More d we analyzed static and repeated game versions. We showed that the commitment problem can be solved through a reputation and self-enforcement mechanism, and presented some implications for corporate governance. Third, we constructed a dynamic context of Holdup, performed a monotonicity analysis, and interpreted the analytical results from the viewpoint of contract incompleteness crucial in the Holdup problems.With regard to the government sector, we focused on Decentralization Reform. We analyzed the incentives for local governments to improve the public balance under resident migration, and showed that whether a local government makes its fiscal balance efficient depends on the condition of population distribution. If the residents' utility in a congested region gets worse due to the inflow of population from a sparse region, the local government in the congested region will not make efforts but rather worsen its public balance. Thus, under decentralization, local governments do not always make efforts efficiently, and the population distribution is not guaranteed to be efficient.Lastly, with regard to the Super-National Sector, we examined the Euro-zone finance governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), where the European Commission tries to enforce SGP and Euro-zone member countries are expected to keep the SGP rule. The paper traced the process how the European Commission had unsuccessfully fought against the France's deviation from the SGP rule, through their recommendation to apply the penalty in order to ensure the value of the common currency, the Euro, and then analyzed it in a game theoretic framework. Less