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A Contract Theoretical Analysis of Governance

治理的契约理论分析

基本信息

批准号：
17530192
负责人：
SUZUKI Yutaka
金额：
$ 1.09万
依托单位：
Hosei University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2006
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530192/
关键词：
Economic Theory Public Finance Public Economics Politics Political Economy Governance Contract Theory

项目摘要

The purpose of this project was to investigate and compare the Centralization vs. Decentralization problem in the three fields of private, government, and super-national sectors, based on a shared understanding that the concept of 'governance' can be applied as devices for internalizing and solving various externalities existing among players or actors.With regard to the corporate governance problem in the private sector, we first presented a comparative theory of "Non-Integrated", "Integrated", and "Decentralized" firms. Non-integrated firms fail to consider the externalities that managers' decisions have on other firms. While integrated firms internalize these externalities, they do not consider the "private benefits" of managers. The Decentralized Firm works as a hybrid of these two structures. We also interpreted our model from the viewpoint of allocation of formal authority. Second, we considered a bilateral moral hazard framework where the principal is also a productive agent, an … More d we analyzed static and repeated game versions. We showed that the commitment problem can be solved through a reputation and self-enforcement mechanism, and presented some implications for corporate governance. Third, we constructed a dynamic context of Holdup, performed a monotonicity analysis, and interpreted the analytical results from the viewpoint of contract incompleteness crucial in the Holdup problems.With regard to the government sector, we focused on Decentralization Reform. We analyzed the incentives for local governments to improve the public balance under resident migration, and showed that whether a local government makes its fiscal balance efficient depends on the condition of population distribution. If the residents' utility in a congested region gets worse due to the inflow of population from a sparse region, the local government in the congested region will not make efforts but rather worsen its public balance. Thus, under decentralization, local governments do not always make efforts efficiently, and the population distribution is not guaranteed to be efficient.Lastly, with regard to the Super-National Sector, we examined the Euro-zone finance governance through the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), where the European Commission tries to enforce SGP and Euro-zone member countries are expected to keep the SGP rule. The paper traced the process how the European Commission had unsuccessfully fought against the France's deviation from the SGP rule, through their recommendation to apply the penalty in order to ensure the value of the common currency, the Euro, and then analyzed it in a game theoretic framework. Less

本项目的目的是调查和比较私营部门、政府部门和超国家部门三个领域的集权与分权问题，基于“治理”概念可以作为内部化和解决参与者或行为者之间存在的各种外部性的手段的共识。针对私营部门的公司治理问题，我们首先提出了“非一体化”、“一体化”和“一体化”的比较理论。 “分散”的公司。非一体化企业未能考虑管理者的决策对其他企业的外部性。虽然整合型企业将这些外部性内部化，但它们没有考虑管理者的“私人利益”。去中心化公司是这两种结构的混合体。我们还从正式权力分配的角度解释了我们的模型。其次，我们考虑了双边道德风险框架，其中委托人也是生产代理人，并且我们分析了静态和重复的游戏版本。我们表明，承诺问题可以通过声誉和自我执行机制来解决，并提出了对公司治理的一些启示。第三，我们构建了Holdup的动态背景，进行了单调性分析，并从Holdup问题中至关重要的契约不完备性的角度解释了分析结果。对于政府部门，我们重点关注分权改革。我们分析了居民流动条件下地方政府改善公共平衡的激励因素，结果表明地方政府财政平衡是否有效取决于人口分布状况。如果人口稠密地区的人口流入导致稠密地区的居民效用变差，那么稠密地区的地方政府不仅不会做出努力，反而会恶化其公共平衡。因此，在分权下，地方政府并不总是有效地努力，人口分配也无法保证有效。最后，关于超国家部门，我们通过《稳定与增长公约》（SGP）审视了欧元区的金融治理，欧盟委员会试图强制执行SGP，而欧元区成员国则希望维持SGP规则。该论文追溯了欧盟委员会如何通过建议实施惩罚以确保共同货币欧元的价值来阻止法国偏离SGP规则，但未成功的过程，然后在博弈论框架中进行分析。较少的

项目成果

期刊论文数量（19）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in International Duopoly : A Note on Infinite Horizon Formulation

国际双寡头垄断中的倾销行为与反倾销法:无限视野表述的注记

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
Journal of Economic Research (Official Journal of Asia-Pacific Economic Association) 10巻2号
影响因子：
0
作者：
Abe;Yukiko;Keiko Tamada.;Yutaka Suzuki;増田信彦;Yukiko Abe and Akiko S. Oishi;張南;安部由起子・田中藍子;Yutaka Suzuki
通讯作者：
Yutaka Suzuki

Eurozone Finance Governance through the Stability and Growth pact, January 2002-November2003

通过《稳定与增长公约》实施的欧元区金融治理，2002 年 1 月至 2003 年 11 月