Theories of International Financial Institutions

这是一个关于国际金融机构的令人兴奋和及时的项目。该项目继续发展国际金融机构的一般理论，以应对订约代理人执行国际协定的能力不完善的问题。这一理论为国际债务危机等重大问题提供了新的见解。这位调查员过去在这一领域和相关领域的工作对国际金融有许多有价值的见解。他有能力继续这项研究。执行与外国代理人达成的协议的动机有限，构成了全球资本市场的一个重大缺陷。参与国际资源转移的各种机构的出现是对这一缺陷的部分反应。银行、跨国公司、储备货币和车辆货币就是三个例子。这个项目的贡献在于为这些机构开发了一个普遍的理论。特别是，这些机构的声誉可能会让它们的股权所有者(或者在储备货币的情况下，是央行)签订自我强制执行的合同。一家私人银行的声誉，可能会让它做出偿还存款的可信承诺，并惩罚违约的借款人。跨国公司或许能够与债权人和雇员建立长期关系，并提供比匿名个人代理人更有效的产品质量水平。最后，一些政府可能比其他政府更有说服力地承诺停止征收通货膨胀率税。特定国家经济体支持有能力承担这些任务的机构的能力，可能与它们因跨期偏好和技术而产生的动态行为的基本方面有关。

This is an exciting and timely project on international financial institutions. The project continues to develop a general theory of international financial institutions as a response to the imperfect ability of contracting agents to enforce international agreements. This theory provides new insights into such important issues as the international debt crisis. The investigator's past work in this and related areas is responsible for a number of valuable insights into international finance. He is capable of continuing this research. The limited incentive to enforce agreements with foreign agents constitutes a significant imperfection in world capital markets. Various institutions that are engaged in the international transfer of resources have emerged as a partial response to this imperfection. Banks, multinational corporations, and reserve and vehicle currencies are three examples. The contribution of this project comes in developing a general theory for these institutions. In particular, the reputations of these institutions may allow their equity owners (or central banks, in the case of reserve currencies) to enter into contracts that are self-enforcing. The reputation of a private bank, may allow it to make credible commitments to repay deposits and to penalize borrowers in default. A multinational corporation may be able to enter into long-term relationships with creditors and employees, and to provide a more efficient level of product quality than would be possible for an anonymous individual agent. Finally, some governments may more credibly promise to desist from imposing the inflation tax than others. The ability of particular national economies to support institutions capable of undertaking these tasks can be related to fundamental aspects of their dynamic behavior derived from intertemporal preferences and technologies.