An Investigation of Behavior in Experiments with Sample Bargaining Games

博弈论的预测经常与 简单的讨价还价游戏和几个实验 investigators. 这些结果被解释为 玩家对公平或恶意的关注。 然而，广泛 以前实验的不同设计和缺乏严肃的 试图复制它们， 不可能的 这一点特别重要，因为目前 实验证据表明，简单游戏的结果 可能对实验过程的细节非常敏感。 此外，可能不可能构造博弈的直接测试， 理论模型，即使程序效应已被理解。 这 是因为目前的模型假设了一个已知的态度分布， 对公平和恶意的看法 该项目进行 探索实验程序的影响的实验， 公平和怨恨的影响。 该项目开发一个 基于理论的，经过实验检验的计量经济学模型，提供 公平和怨恨分布的简单估计 讨价还价的游戏 博弈论被越来越广泛地应用于 经济学，所以更明确的证据的有效性，游戏 讨价还价理论和修正博弈的新统计工具 理论模型将是一个重大贡献。 该项目进行独裁者和最后通牒游戏的实验。 在这些实验中，玩家将一定数量的钱（ 他们之间， 最后通牒博弈包括两个阶段 第一个参与者提出一个“要么接受要么放弃”的提议 第二个玩家必须接受或拒绝（第一阶段） 2）。 还价是不可能的。 在独裁者游戏中， 第一个玩家提出了第二个玩家不能接受的提议， 回答。 传统模型预测，在每场比赛中， 第一个行动者给第二个参与者最小的正金额 在最后通牒博弈中，第二个参与者接受 这个提议 在实验中经常观察到， 相当一部分先行者提出了不平凡的提议，甚至 在独裁者博弈中出价不能被拒绝 这 行为常常被归因于对公平的关注。 然而，以前的实验结果没有提供 足够的信息来确定玩家是否试图 公平地说，重要的提议是否反映了提议者的 关于他们的对手可能接受什么，或者是否 其他动机影响行为。 也没有两个先前的研究 使用相同的实验程序。 进行的实验 将决定这种行为是否是系统性的 而且可以预测

The predictions of game theory are often contradicted in experiments with simple bargaining games and several investigators. These results have been interpreted as being due to players' concerns for fairness or spite. However, the widely varying designs of the previous experiments and the lack of serious attempts to replicate them make a precise interpretation impossible. This is of particular importance since current experimental evidence suggests that the outcomes of simple games may be very sensitive to the details of experimental procedure. Moreover, it may be impossible to construct a direct test of game theoretic models, even if procedural effects are understood. This is because current models assume a known distribution of attitudes toward fairness and spite among the players. This project conducts experiments that explore the effects of experimental procedures and the influence of fairness and spite. The project develops a theory-based, experimentally tested econometric model that provides estimates of the distribution of fairness and spite in simple bargaining games. Game theory is widely and increasingly used in economics, so more definitive evidence on the validity of game theory in bargaining and new statistical tools for correcting game theoretic models would be a major contribution. The project conducts experiments with dictator and ultimatum games. In these experiments, players divide a given amount of money (the pie) between themselves. An ultimatum game consists of two stages in which the first player makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer (stage 1) and the second player must either accept or reject (stage 2). Counter-offers are not possible. In a dictator game, the first player makes an offer to which the second player cannot respond. The conventional model predicts that in each game the first mover offers the second player the smallest positive amount possible and, in the ultimatum game, that the second player accepts this offer. It is regularly observed in experiments that substantial fractions of first movers make non-trivial offers, even in the dictator game where offers cannot be rejected. This behavior frequently is attributed to concerns of fairness. However, the results of previous experiments do not provide sufficient information to determine whether players are trying to be fair, whether non-trivial offers are reflections of proposers' beliefs about what their opponents are likely to accept, or whether other motivations influence behavior. Also no two previous studies used the same experimental procedures. The experiments conducted by this project will determine whether the behavior is systematic and predictable.