Collaborative Research: In Experimental Studies of Auction Markets

本项目分为三个部分。 第一部分论述 共同价值（矿产权）拍卖中的学习过程。 没有经验的投标人在这些拍卖遭受赢家的 诅咒，赚取负利润和出价高于预期 价值取决于赢得该项目。 经验投标人调整 逆向选择的力量，最终获得积极的 利润 问题是主体到底是什么 学习 他们是否只是在学着降低出价， 环境，作为一种后果， 获胜，或者学习理解逆向选择的力量， 这表明我们有能力 环境. 这项研究对以下方面具有实际意义： 了解矿业权拍卖中的投标行为， 与最近对学习过程的理论兴趣相吻合 在经济上也是如此。 第二部分研究私人价值双向拍卖。 最近 双边拍卖机制理论分析的进展 集中于一次性拍卖， 估值是从分布中随机抽取的， 这是常识，交易者的需求缺乏弹性， 或者说，在保留地， 价格是私下知道的。 详细游戏的动机 对特定交易规则的理论研究， 交易规则和每个交易者的策略行为 利用他的私人信息联合收割机来决定交易条件 基本上反映了所有发放的信息。 在 这个项目，这些交易的实验调查， 规则旨在确定这些行为的鲁棒性， 预测。 这些研究是重要的，因为双向拍卖 是市场经济的基本贸易环境。 最后一部分涉及实验和实地研究， 有激励合同的拍卖。 激励合同使 付款取决于投标和实现的成本。 如果 实现成本超过公司的出价，公司负责 成本超支;如果公司成功地 保持其成本低于其出价，这是要求被允许 来降低部分成本 激励合同是 具有相当大的潜在实际意义， 国防武器采购，并普遍采用在 建筑业作为固定价格投标的替代方案 合同. 此外，纳什均衡投标理论使 几个明确和新颖的预测激励合同， 还有待系统研究。

There are three parts in this project. The first part deals with learning processes in common value (mineral rights) auctions. Inexperienced bidders in these auctions suffer from the winner's curse, earning negative profits and bidding above the expected value conditional on winning the item. Experience bidders adjust to the adverse selection forces, eventually earning positive profits. The question is exactly what it is that subjects are learning. Are they simply learning to bid less for any given environment, a reaction to losing money as a consequence of winning, or learning to understand the adverse selection forces, which would indicate some ability to generalize across environments. The research has practical implications for understanding bidding behavior in mineral rights auctions and coincides with recent theoretical interest in learning processes in economics as well. The second part studies private value double auctions. Recent developments in theoretical analyses of double auction mechanisms have concentrated on single shot auctions in which traders' valuations are drawn randomly from distributions whose structure is common knowledge, and in which traders have inelastic demands or supplies for a single unit of consumption at a reservation price that is privately known. The motivation for detailed game theoretical studies of particular trading rules is to elaborate precisely how trading rules and each trader's strategic behavior using his private information combine to determine terms of trade that reflect substantially all the disbursed information. In this project, the experimental investigation of these trading rules is designed to determine the behavioral robustness of these predictions. These studies are important since double auctions are a fundamental trading environment for market economies. The last part deals with experimental and field studies of auctions with incentive contracts. Incentive contracts make the payment depend both on the bid and the realized cost. If realized cost exceeds the firm's bid, the firm is responsible for some farction of the cost overrun; if the firm succeeds in keeping its cost below its bid, it is reqarded by being allowed to keep part of the cost underrun. Incentive contracts are of considerable potential practical importance in Department of Defense weapons acquisition and are commonly employed in the construction industry as an alternative to fixed price bid contracts. Further, Nash equilibrium bidding theory makes several clear and novel predictions for incentive contracts that have yet to be subject to systematic study.