Democracy and Collective Action: Strategies, Heuristics and Cooperation

9515344肖尔茨公民为什么要遵守民主法律？考虑一下，例如，用税法来为想要的公共产品筹集资金，或者用环境法来最大限度地减少公认的公共不良。服从会让每个人过得更好，但搭便车和逃避公民义务的诱惑让服从成为一个不确定的命题。霍布斯威慑对于获得遵守是必不可少的吗，或者社会合作能否支持遵守旨在解决集体行动问题的法律？肖尔茨之前的NSF研究表明，遵守行为只能通过威慑来部分解释，需要集体行动情况下的合作理论来理解对民主法律的服从。他提出的“信任启发式”从对政府的信任、对其他公民的信任以及其他公民态度的角度解释了合作，这些态度反映了公民对合作社的积极和消极体验。当个体对集体的态度变得更积极时，个人合作的可能性就会增加，这些态度启发式复制了与囚犯困境游戏中稳健的合作策略相关的“好的、报复的、但宽容的”特征，因此可能为社会合作提供基础。信任启发式代表了“社会资本”，它极大地提高了薄弱的执行机构保持遵守(合作)解决集体行动问题的法律的能力。为了进一步发展和检验这一假设，并为大规模集体行动背景下的合作理论提供更坚实的基础，本研究：1)扩展了基于二人完全信息囚徒困境博弈的现有结果，考察了稳健策略的一般性质，这些策略能够支持n人集体行动问题的合作解决方案。2)利用实验室实验来检验人类受试者在集体行动环境中使用的形式策略和启发式策略之间的对应关系。这项研究综合了五位富有成效的研究人员的不同方法，这些方法对于解决在大规模集体行动环境中进行合作这一具有挑战性的问题至关重要。这种结合的方法论可以应用于许多其他集体行动问题，应该会引起各种社会科学研究人员的极大兴趣。***

9515344 Scholz Why do citizens obey democratic laws? Consider, for example tax laws to collect money for desired public goods or environmental laws to minimize widely-recognized public bads. Obedience would leave everyone better off, but the temptation to free ride and shirk citizenship duties makes obedience an uncertain proposition. Is Hobbesian deterrence essential to gain compliance, or can social cooperation support compliance with laws designed to resolve collective action problems? Scholz's prior NSF research suggests that compliance behavior can only partly be explained by deterrence, and that a theory of cooperation in collective action situations is needed to understand obedience with democratic laws. His proposed "trust heuristic" explains cooperation in terms of trust in government, trust in other citizens, and other civic attitudes that reflect the positive and negative experiences the citizen has with the cooperative. Tm the extent that the individual's likelihood of cooperation increases as attitudes become more positive toward the collective, these attitudinal heuristics replicate the "nice, retaliatory, yet forgiving" characteristics associated with robust cooperative strategies in prisoners dilemma games, and hence may provide the basis for social cooperation. The trust heuristic represents "social capital" which dramatically increases the ability of weak enforcement agencies to maintain compliance (cooperation) with laws resolving collective action problems. To further develop and test this hypothesis and also to provide a more solid foundation for the theory of cooperation in large-scale collective action settings, the current research: 1) extends existing results based on 2-person, full information prisoners dilemma games to investigate the generic properties of robust strategies capable of supporting cooperative solutions to n- person collective action problems. 2) utilizes laboratory experiments to test the correspondence bet ween formal strategies and heuristics used by human subjects in collective action settings. The research integrates the diverse approaches of five productive researchers essential for tackling the challenging problem of cooperation in large-scale collective action settings. The combined methodology can be applied to numerous other collective action problems and should be of great interest to a variety of social science researchers. ***