Deliberation and Voting in Committees

在过去的十年里，已经发展了一大批文献，在简单的选举模型中研究不对称信息和战略投票的含义。到目前为止，核心问题集中在不同的选举规则如何收集信息或促使人们放弃投票。然而，选民如何获得不对称信息的问题在很大程度上还没有被探索。特别令人感兴趣的是，特别是在小型委员会的背景下，投票前选民之间沟通的效果问题，即审议。投票前的战略沟通增加了复杂性，因为选民不仅必须关注在什么情况下他们的投票是关键，而且在什么情况下他们的公开声明是关键的。将这两种考虑因素结合起来，反过来又导致委员会成员需要对投票和发言之间的互动保持敏感。私人投资机构将使用不完全信息沟通的战略(博弈论)模型来探索审议和投票之间的这种互动。这项研究将确定关于投票(例如，使用多数投票或一致投票)和辩论(例如，委员会的决定和审议如何受到个人发言顺序或对发言内容的限制的影响)的制度安排，以最好地促进知情和有效的沟通和集体决策。沟通和辩论被认为是集体选择的重要方面，在委员会和选举一级都是如此，但人们对沟通和投票的替代体制安排对辩论性质和集体决定的影响却知之甚少。该项目的结果应提高我们对这些问题的理解，从而促进关于审议在集体选择中的作用的实质性讨论。

Over the last ten years a large literature has developed looking at the implications of asymmetric information and strategic voting in simple models of elections. Up to now the central questions have focused on the manner in which different electoral rules aggregate information or contribute to an incentive to abstain from voting. However, the question of how voters come to be asymmetrically informed has been largely unexplored. Of particular interest, particularly in the context of small committees is the question of the effects of communication among voters prior to voting, i.e. deliberation. Strategic communication prior to voting creates an additional level of complexity in that voters must be concerned not only about the circumstances under which their vote is pivotal, but also about the circumstances under which their public statements are pivotal. Incorporating both sorts of consideration in turn leads to a need for committee members to be sensitive to interactions between voting and speaking. The PIs will explore such interactions between deliberation and voting using strategic (game-theoretic) models of communication with incomplete information. The research will identify institutional arrangements regarding voting (for instance, using majority or unanimity voting) and debate (for instance, how committee decisions and deliberation are affected by the order in which individuals speak or the constraints on what can be said) that best promote informed and efficient communication and collective decision-making. Communication and debate are considered important aspects of collective choice, both at the committee and the electoral level, yet implications for the character of debate and collective decisions of alternative institutional arrangements for communication and voting are very little understood. Results from the project should improve our understanding of the issues and thus inform substantive discussions on the role of deliberation in collective choice.