Doctoral Dissertation Research: Do Irrelevant Payoffs Affect Behavior When a Dominant Strategy is Available: Experimental Evidence from Second-Price Auctions

在具有私人价值的第二价格拍卖（SPA）中，提交最高出价的竞标者赢得拍卖并支付第二高出价。 在SPA中，每个投标人同时提交一个投标。 根据理论，投标人的最佳策略是准确地出价，即对自己来说该物品的价值。在博弈论中，这种最优出价被称为“优势策略”，也就是说，无论其他投标人出价多少，它对每个投标人都是最优的。优势策略具有强大的属性，但在拍卖环境中非常罕见。 过去的实验室实验证据表明，投标人几乎总是出价高于与SPA中的优势策略相对应的金额，即根据理论，他们的行为是非理性的。 这个项目研究的猜想，虽然投标行为是不合理的，它确实响应于一个明智的和可预测的方式激励。实验室实验将测试高于优势策略的出价是否会在这种过度出价成本较低时增加，而在成本较高时减少，即使实验的构造使得这些激励措施不会影响优势策略出价本身的价值。如果猜想被证明是正确的，结果将为销售机制的设计者提供信息。 虽然博弈论做出了非常明确的预测，但投标人的行为往往不完全像预测的那样。 从研究系统偏离理论的调查结果可以纳入拍卖设计师谁希望最大限度地提高收入或效率。 鉴于政府和私营部门都使用这种拍卖来出售各种证券和实物资产，这种研究的实际应用非常广泛。

In a second-price auction (SPA) with private values, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins the auction and pays the second highest bid. In a SPA, bidders simultaneously submit one bid each. According to theory, the bidder's best strategy is to bid exactly what the item is worth to her. In game theory parlance this optimal bid is known as a "dominant strategy," that is, it is optimal for each bidder regardless of what others are bidding. Dominant strategies have robust properties but are extremely rare in auction environments. Past evidence from laboratory experiments has shown that bidders almost always bid above the amount corresponding to the dominant strategy in an SPA, i.e. they behave irrationally according to the theory. This project examines the conjecture that, while bidding behavior is not rational, it does respond in a sensible and predictable way to incentives. A laboratory experiment will test whether bids above the dominant strategy increase when such overbidding is less costly, and decrease when it is more costly, even though the experiment is constructed so that these incentives do not affect the value of the dominant strategy bid itself.Should the conjecture prove correct, the results will inform designers of selling mechanisms. Although game theory makes very clear predictions, bidders do not often behave exactly as predicted. Results from investigations that examine systematic deviations from the theory can be incorporated by auction designers who wish to maximize revenue or efficiency. Given that such auctions have been used by both government and the private sector to sell a variety of securities and physical assets, the practical applications of such research are widespread.