TC: Small: A Cryptographic Treatment of the Wiretap Channel

该项目以一种新的方式提供通信安全，基于信道噪声而不是标准的加密结构和算法。这个想法很老了，起源于20世纪70年代的信息理论和编码领域，但是这种经典的工作使用了较弱的安全度量，即使在那时也无法提供任何明确和实用的设计。这项研究弥合了这一经典工作与现代密码学之间的差距。首先，它以安全度量的形式提供了良好的理论基础，这些度量改编自现代密码学，并且要求比经典度量更强的安全性。其次，它提供了明确的、有效的和最优的方法来实现这些指标下的安全性，仅基于从发送方到对手的通道比从发送方到接收方的通道噪声更大的假设。与标准密码学不同，这种方法不容易受到算法和对手计算能力的进步的影响，因此为保护高度敏感的信息提供了一种新的选择。

This project provides communication security in a new way, based on channel noise rather than standard cryptographic constructs and algorithms. The idea is old, from work in the 1970s in the information-theory and coding field, but this classical work used weak security metrics and even then was not able to provide any explicit and practical designs. This research bridges the gap between this classical work and modern cryptography. First, it provides a sound theoretical basis in the form of security metrics that are adapted from modern cryptography and demand much stronger security than the classical metrics. Second, it provides explicit, efficient and optimal methods to achieve security under these metrics based only on the assumption that the channel from sender to adversary is noisier than the channel from sender to receiver. Unlike standard cryptography, this approach is not vulnerable to advances in algorithms and adversary computing power and thus provides a new option to secure highly sensitive information.