Financial System and Corporate Governance in Japan and East Asia

本研究考察了日本和其他东亚国家的公司治理。首先，关于日本的研究，我们考察了被认为是日本公司治理的主要银行的作用有效性。实证结果不支持传统的观点，即即使在20世纪70年代和80年代的繁荣时期，主要银行也提高了管理效率，特别是在制造业。相反，我们发现市场竞争一直有助于有效的公司治理。我们认为，由于监管和防止银行倒闭的综合网络缺乏激励，银行无法成为良好的监督者。其次，在东亚其他国家的研究中，我们考察了这些国家普遍存在的家族企业的公司治理。我们发现所有权非常集中在家族成员手中。此外，控股股东不仅担任高层管理人员，而且在董事会中占主导地位。这一结构在危机后没有显著改变。股权结构有利于控股股东以牺牲中小股东利益为代价侵占公司资产。内部市场，特别是在家族企业集团内部创建的市场，似乎有利于资源隧道化。

This research investigates corporate governance in Japan and other East Asian countries. First, regarding research on Japan, we investigate the effectiveness of the role of the main bank which has been regarded as corporate governance of Japanese firms. The empirical results do not support the conventional view that main banks enhance the management efficiency in particular in the manufacturing industry even during the boom period of 1970s and 1980s. Instead, we find that market competition has consistently contributed to efficient corporate governance. We argue that banks could not be good monitors for lack of incentives due to regulations and the comprehensive network to prevent bank failures. Second, regarding research on other East Asian countries, we investigate corporate governance of family firms that are prevalent in those countries. We find that the ownership is very concentrated in the hands of family members. In addition, the controlling shareholders not only act as top managers but also dominate the board of directors. This structure does not change significantly after the crisis. The ownership structure may enhance the controlling shareholders to expropriate corporate assets at the expenses of minority shareholders. Internal markets that are created in particular inside family owned business groups appear to facilitate resource tunneling.