STARSS: Small: Collaborative: Physical Design for Secure Split Manufacturing of ICs

STARSS：小型：协作：IC 安全分割制造的物理设计

• 批准号: 1618824
• 负责人: Jiang Hu
• 金额: $ 16.67万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-10-01 至 2020-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1618824&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; Collaborative; Physical; Design

The trend of outsourcing semiconductor manufacturing to oversea foundries has introduced several security vulnerabilities -- reverse engineering, malicious circuit insertion, counterfeiting, and intellectual property piracy -- making the semiconductor industry lose billions of dollars. Split manufacturing of integrated circuits reduces vulnerabilities introduced by an untrusted foundry by manufacturing only some of the layers at an untrusted high-end foundry and the remaining layers at a trusted low-end foundry. An attacker in the untrusted foundry has access only to an incomplete design, and therefore cannot easily pirate or insert Trojans into it. However, split manufacturing alone is not sufficiently secure, and naïve security enhancement techniques incur tremendous power, area, and delay overhead. The goal of this research is to develop new physical-design techniques that can ensure security through split manufacturing and simultaneously minimize the overhead on performance, power and area of semiconductor products.This research lays the foundations for a comprehensive set of physical design tools for security. Its expected outcomes are: 1) Systematic techniques for modeling attacks that recover the missing parts of the design from the information available to the attacker; 2) Security metrics to assess the strength of integrated circuit designs by measuring the difficulty for an attacker to reverse engineer the design in the context of split manufacturing; 3) Active defenses through physical designs techniques such as cell layout, placement perturbation and rerouting designs to increase security; 4) Techniques to reduce the overhead of secure split manufacturing and make the security enhancement seamlessly compatible with existing design flows.

将半导体制造外包给海外代工厂的趋势带来了几个安全漏洞-逆向工程，恶意电路插入，假冒和知识产权盗版-使半导体行业损失数十亿美元。集成电路的分离制造通过在不可信的高端代工厂仅制造一些层并且在可信的低端代工厂制造剩余层来减少由不可信的代工厂引入的漏洞。不可信代工厂中的攻击者只能访问不完整的设计，因此无法轻易盗版或插入特洛伊木马。然而，单独的拆分制造并不足够安全，简单的安全增强技术会带来巨大的功耗、面积和延迟开销。本研究的目标是开发新的物理设计技术，通过分离制造来确保安全性，同时最大限度地减少半导体产品的性能，功耗和面积的开销。本研究为一套全面的安全性物理设计工具奠定了基础。其预期成果是：1）用于对攻击进行建模的系统技术，该攻击从攻击者可获得的信息中恢复设计的缺失部分; 2）通过测量攻击者在分离制造的背景下对设计进行逆向工程的难度来评估集成电路设计的强度的安全度量; 3）通过物理设计技术（例如单元布局、布局扰动和重新布线设计）进行主动防御以增加安全性; 4）减少安全分离制造的开销并使安全增强与现有设计流程无缝兼容的技术。