STARSS: Small: Collaborative: Physical Design for Secure Split Manufacturing of ICs

STARSS：小型：协作：IC 安全分割制造的物理设计

• 批准号: 1822840
• 负责人: Jeyavijayan Rajendran
• 金额: $ 9.59万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-09-01 至 2019-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1822840&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: STARSS; Small; Collaborative; Physical; Design

The trend of outsourcing semiconductor manufacturing to oversea foundries has introduced several security vulnerabilities -- reverse engineering, malicious circuit insertion, counterfeiting, and intellectual property piracy -- making the semiconductor industry lose billions of dollars. Split manufacturing of integrated circuits reduces vulnerabilities introduced by an untrusted foundry by manufacturing only some of the layers at an untrusted high-end foundry and the remaining layers at a trusted low-end foundry. An attacker in the untrusted foundry has access only to an incomplete design, and therefore cannot easily pirate or insert Trojans into it. However, split manufacturing alone is not sufficiently secure, and naïve security enhancement techniques incur tremendous power, area, and delay overhead. The goal of this research is to develop new physical-design techniques that can ensure security through split manufacturing and simultaneously minimize the overhead on performance, power and area of semiconductor products.This research lays the foundations for a comprehensive set of physical design tools for security. Its expected outcomes are: 1) Systematic techniques for modeling attacks that recover the missing parts of the design from the information available to the attacker; 2) Security metrics to assess the strength of integrated circuit designs by measuring the difficulty for an attacker to reverse engineer the design in the context of split manufacturing; 3) Active defenses through physical designs techniques such as cell layout, placement perturbation and rerouting designs to increase security; 4) Techniques to reduce the overhead of secure split manufacturing and make the security enhancement seamlessly compatible with existing design flows.

将半导体制造外包给海外代工厂的趋势带来了一些安全漏洞——逆向工程、恶意电路插入、假冒和知识产权盗版——使半导体行业损失了数十亿美元。集成电路的分离制造通过只在不可信的高端代工厂制造一些层，而在可信的低端代工厂制造其余层，减少了由不可信的代工厂引入的漏洞。不受信任的铸造厂中的攻击者只能访问不完整的设计，因此无法轻松地盗版或插入木马程序。但是，单独拆分制造并不足够安全，并且naïve安全增强技术会产生巨大的功率、面积和延迟开销。本研究的目标是开发新的物理设计技术，通过分离制造来确保安全性，同时将半导体产品的性能，功率和面积的开销降至最低。这项研究为一套全面的安全物理设计工具奠定了基础。其预期结果是：1)系统的攻击建模技术，从攻击者可用的信息中恢复设计的缺失部分；2)安全指标，通过测量攻击者在分裂制造背景下对设计进行逆向工程的难度来评估集成电路设计的强度；3)主动防御通过物理设计技术，如单元布局，放置扰动和重路由设计，以增加安全性；4)降低安全分离制造开销的技术，并使安全性增强与现有设计流程无缝兼容。

项目成果

The Cat and Mouse in Split Manufacturing

分体制造中的猫和老鼠

• DOI: 10.1109/tvlsi.2017.2787754
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI
• 作者: Wang, Yujie;Chen, Pu;Hu, Jiang;Li, Guofeng;Rajendran, Jeyavijayan
• 通讯作者: Rajendran, Jeyavijayan