SaTC: STARSS: Small: Combined Side-channel Attacks and Mathematical Foundations of Combined Countermeasures
SaTC: STARSS: Small: Combined Side-channel Attacks and Mathematical Foundations of Combined Countermeasures
批准号:
1715286
负责人:
Selcuk Kose
金额:
$24.67万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2017
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2017-10-01 至 2019-05-31
中文摘要
数字信息已经成为我们日常生活中不可或缺的一部分,人们越来越关注信息的安全。随着智能手机、平板电脑、可穿戴设备等高科技电子产品的普及,需要保护的信息越来越多。因此,来自恶意方获取存储在安全(即加密)设备中的秘密信息的攻击次数增加。侧信道攻击被广泛用于从集成电路(IC)或智能卡中提取信息,通过观察不同的泄漏源,如功耗、定时信息、温度、电磁(EM)发射和声波,同时加载/执行/存储信息。侧信道攻击由于其低成本和潜在的非侵入性,对个人、商业和军事信息安全构成严重威胁。通过提供针对侧信道攻击的设计指南,我们的项目使公司、政府和个人在保护数字信息方面受益。该项目研究了组合侧信道攻击的功率和可行性,包括物理侧信道攻击(即功率,定时和电磁)和故障注入攻击。由于每个攻击向量利用不同的泄漏机制,因此针对不同攻击向量的对策可能有很大不同。在此基础上,建立了多攻击向量联合对抗的数学基础。在这个项目中,现有资源被用作对抗组合攻击的对策,以及专用对策,以最大限度地减少安全的能源和性能开销。该项目为少数群体和本科生提供了参与硬件安全研究的机会。
英文摘要
Digital information has become an integral part of our daily lives and there is a growing concern about the security of information. The amount of information that should be kept secure is increasing with the proliferation of high-tech electronics such as smart-phones, tablets, and wearable devices. Accordingly, the number of attacks from malicious parties to obtain the secret information that is stored in a secure (i.e., encrypted) device increases. Side-channel attacks are widely used to extract information from an integrated circuit (IC) or a smart card by observing different leakage sources such as power consumption, timing information, temperature, electromagnetic (EM) emanations, and acoustic waves while loading/executing/storing information. Due to the low cost and potentially non-invasive nature, side-channel attacks pose a serious threat to the security of personal, commercial, and military information. By providing design guidelines against side-channel attacks, our project benefits companies, governments, and individuals in securing the digital information.This project investigates the power and feasibility of combined side-channel attacks including both physical side-channel attacks (i.e., power, timing, and electromagnetic) and fault injection attacks. Since each attack vector leverages a different leakage mechanism, the countermeasures against different attack vectors may differ significantly. Accordingly, mathematical foundations of combined countermeasures against multiple attack vectors are developed. In this project, the existing resources are utilized as a countermeasure against combined attacks together with dedicated countermeasures to minimize the energy and performance overheads of security. This project provides several opportunities to underrepresented groups and undergraduate students to engage in hardware security research.
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SaTC: STARSS: Small: Combined Side-channel Attacks and Mathematical Foundations of Combined Countermeasures
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批准号:1929774
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$20.92万
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财政年份:2019
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负责人:Selcuk Kose
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依托单位:
CAREER: Regulator-Gating (ReGa): A New On-Chip Power Delivery Architecture
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批准号:1929777
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$8.79万
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财政年份:2019
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负责人:Selcuk Kose
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依托单位:
CAREER: Regulator-Gating (ReGa): A New On-Chip Power Delivery Architecture
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批准号:1350451
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$45.0万
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财政年份:2014
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负责人:Selcuk Kose
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依托单位:
海外基金