Redistribution in a Divided Society

虽然有大量文献探讨了再分配政策的政治竞争逻辑，但除了收入水平的划分之外，很少有理论研究包括社会分裂的存在。 然而，很少有观察家认为，如果不考虑种族分歧带来的复杂性，就可以理解美国的再分配政治。 此外，美国并不是唯一根据归属特征划分的国家。 虽然各国之间的分歧各不相同，但具有政治意义的种族、民族、宗教或语言分歧却普遍存在。 本研究的目的是研究在一个由种族、宗教、语言或其他归属特征划分的社会中，再分配政策的政治冲突。 在过去，由于难以沿沿着两个或多个维度对政策选择进行建模，理论工作中对非经济分歧的考虑一直受到抑制。 形式理论的最新发展使我们有可能建立一个严格的模型，来描述一个被归属特征和收入划分的社会中的再分配冲突。 该研究将建立一个综合的政治经济学模型，其中个人的收入能力和归属特征（在这里，种族）区分;政策空间是一个比例再分配税率和对劳动力市场上的企业的平权行动约束。 收入分配和政策是内生的，后者是三方立法讨价还价博弈的结果。 本研究将探讨社会分化减少对再分配政策的支持这一主张正确的条件，并更普遍地研究政策结果与异质社会中收入分配之间的关系。 初步结果表明，相对的政治权重给予不同的经济亚群内的少数发挥了重要作用，特别是，更多的权重给予低收入的少数成员，更强调直接再分配通过税收制度相对于间接再分配通过平权行动在劳动力市场。

Although there is a rich literature exploring the logic of political competition over redistributive policies, there are few theoretical studies that include the existence of social cleavages other than the division by income level. Few observers, however, think that the politics of redistribution in the U.S. can be understood without consideration of the complications introduced by racial divisions. Moreover, the U.S. is not unique in being divided according to ascriptive characteristics. While salient cleavages differ from country to country, the existence of politically significant racial ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions is widespread. The goal of this research is to study political conflict over redistributive policies in a society that is divided by race, religion, language, or other ascriptive characteristics. In the past, consideration of non-economic cleavages in theoretical work has been inhibited by the difficulty of modeling policy choices along two or more dimensions. Recent developments in formal theory now make it possible to develop a rigorous model of redistributive conflicts in a society divided by ascriptive traits as well as income. The research will build an integrated political economy model in which individuals are distinguished by earning ability and an ascriptive characteristic (here, race); the policy space is a proportional redistributive tax rate and an affirmative action constraint on firms in the labor market. The distribution of income and the policy are endogenous, with the latter being the outcome of a legislative bargaining game between three parties. This study will explore conditions under which the claim that social divisions reduce the support for redistributive policies is correct and study more generally the relationship between policy outcomes and the distribution of income in heterogeneous societies. Preliminary results suggest that the relative political weights given to different economic subgroups within the minority play an important role; in particular, the more weight accorded to low income members of the minority, the more emphasis there is on direct redistribution through the tax system relative to indirect redistribution through affirmative action in the labor market.