The role of bounded rationality and heuristic decision making for the understanding of the weak development of weather-index insurance market in agriculture

天气指数保险是一种创新的风险管理工具，与传统保险相比，它的管理和监管成本较低，而且不会伴随道德风险或逆向选择问题。尽管有这些优势，农民们还很少使用天气指数保险。考虑到这一点，本研究项目的重点问题，如果有限理性提供了一个最终的解释失踪的意愿，采用这种类型的保险。由于缺乏自然实验，以240名农户为目标样本，采用多阶段单人经营模拟策略类游戏的形式进行了实验室外实验。有两个主要问题需要回答：第一，如果参与者不仅被告知总保险费，而且被告知装载量，对天气指数保险的需求是否会改变？第二，在参与者被告知（不变的负荷）是补贴保险提供的结果的框架中，需求是否发生了变化？

Weather-index insurances are innovative risk management instruments that compared to conventional insurances cause low administration and regulation costs and are not accompanied by moral hazard or adverse selection problems. Despite these advantages, farmers make little use of weather-index insurances as yet. With this in mind, the present research project focuses on the question if bounded rationality provides an eventual explanation for the missing willingness to adopt this type of insurance. For lack of a natural experiment, an extra-laboratory experiment is carried out in the form of a multi-period, single-person business simulation game with a target sample size of 240 farmers. Two major questions are to be answered: first, does the demand for weather-index insurances change if the participants are not only informed about the total insurance premium but also about the loading? Second, does demand change in a framing where participants are told that the (unchanged loading) is the result of a subsidized insurance offer?