An Theoretical Analysis on the Effects of Organization and Corporate Governance Modes of Firms on Oligopolistic Competition

在这项研究中，我们考虑了一个拉古诺模型，在该模型中，具有不同目标和公司治理模式的寡头企业竞争。本文探讨了企业治理目标和治理模式的差异如何影响企业的战略行为以及均衡中的结果和福利。特别地，我们分析了由具有某种目标和融资模式的企业组成的拉古诺寡头垄断，即权益价值最大化（EVM）企业或债务价值最大化（DVM）企业，有限责任下的销售最大化（SM）企业和无债务的利润最大化（PMND）企业，也考虑一个拉古诺寡头垄断，它由不同类型的公司组成。通过比较这些均衡，我们得到了一些见解的性质和福利均衡的结果。

In this study, we consider a la Cournot models in which oligopolistic firms with various objectives and modes of corporate governance competes. We explore how the difference of the objectives and modes of corporate governance of firms affects the strategic behavior of firms and the outcomes and welfare in the equilibrium. In particular, we analyze a la Cournot oligopoly which is composed of firms with a certain type of objective and modes of corporate finance, that is, equity value maximizer (EVM) firms or debt value maximizer (DVM) firms, sales maximize (SM) firms under limited liability and profit maxmizer (PMND) firms with no debt, and also consider a la Cournot oligopoly which is composed of firms with various distinct types of those. By comparing these equilibria, we obtain some insights on properties and welfare equilibrium outcomes.