CAREER: Practical Language-Based End-to-End Security

职业：实用的基于语言的端到端安全

• 批准号: 0133302
• 负责人: Andrew Myers
• 金额: $ 35万
• 依托单位: Cornell University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-01-01 至 2006-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0133302&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CAREER; Practical; Language; Based; End

Increasingly, confidential information is placed on network-accessiblecomputers by organizations and individuals, yet neither the currentpractice nor theories of computer security are adequate to ensure thatthis information remains confidential. The lack of sound mechanismsfor protecting confidential information, especially in the presence ofmalicious code or hosts, creates serious privacy, liability, and evennational security concerns.This research explores new security mechanisms that provide stronger,end-to-end assurance that data remains confidential. The focus is onthree important areas where existing models are inadequate and existingenforcement methods are impractical. First, confidentiality mustbe protected even in systems that include both mutually distrustingprincipals and untrusted, possibly malicious hosts. Second, concurrentand distributed systems create new challenges for information flowcontrol. Third, new techniques are needed for verifying that binarycode, including legacy code, protects confidential information.The goal of this work is fast, practical, end-to-end assurance ofconfidentiality for decentralized systems with mutual distrust. Thiskind of assurance promises to significantly strengthen the security ofthe emerging computing infrastructure.

越来越多的组织和个人将机密信息放置在网络可访问的计算机上，但无论是当前的实践还是计算机安全理论都不足以确保这些信息的机密性。缺乏可靠的机制来保护机密信息，特别是在存在恶意代码或主机的情况下，会产生严重的隐私、责任甚至国家安全问题。这项研究探索了新的安全机制，可以提供更强大的端到端的数据保密保证。 重点是在三个重要领域，现有的模式是不够的，现有的执法方法是不切实际的。 首先，即使在包含相互不信任的主体和不信任的、可能是恶意的主机的系统中，机密性也必须得到保护。其次，并发和分布式系统为信息流控制带来了新的挑战。 第三，需要新的技术来验证二进制代码，包括遗留代码，保护机密信息。这项工作的目标是快速，实用，端到端的相互不信任的分散系统的机密性保证。这种保证有望大大加强新兴计算基础设施的安全性。